


JPRS-EER-92-067  
28 MAY 1992



FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE

---

# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

---

# East Europe

JPRS-EER-92-067

## CONTENTS

28 May 1992

### ALBANIA

'Monist Silence' of Television Criticized	(ZERI / POPULLIT 9 May)	1
Silence on Theft of Revolvers, Machineguns	(ZERI / POPULLIT 8 May)	1
Socialists Attend Reburial of Communist Veteran	(ZERI / POPULLIT 6 May)	2
Article Urges Producer 'on To Stem Inflation	(ALTERNATIVA SD 15 May)	3
Trade Union Paper on Management Corruption	(SENDIKALISTI 6 May)	4
Trade Unionists Assaulted After Strike Threat	(SENDIKALISTI 7 May)	6
Thefts Impede Revival of Enterprises	(BASHKIMI 7 May)	6
Article Calls for Radical Army Reform	(ALTERNATIVA SD 28 Apr)	7
Justice Ministry Official on Foreign Adoption	(ZERI / RINISE 6 May)	9

### HUNGARY

Controversy Over Media Law Proposal Escalates	(HETI VILÁGGAZDASÁG 2 May)	10
Charges Against TV President Hankiss Detailed	(UJ MAGYARORSZÁG 7 Apr)	11
TV President Elemér Hankiss Interviewed	(MAGYAR HÍRLAP 11 Apr)	14

### POLAND

KPN: History, Present Aspirations Discussed	(TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY 12 Apr)	20
Milewski on Defense Policy, Ministerial Structure	(WPROST 26 Apr)	23
Komiszewski on Parys' Attack, Defense Structure	(WPROST 19 Apr)	24
Background on Polish-German Arms Dealings		25
Figures Involved Discussed	(EXPRESS WIECZORNY 30 Mar)	25
Radium Factory Profiled	(KULISTY EXPRESS WIECZORNY 14 1 Apr)	27
American Investor Complaints Aired	(RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE 9 Apr)	29

### 'Monist Silence' of Television Criticized

41.10507369; Tirana ZERI / POPULLIET in Albanian  
9 May 92, p. 1

[Article by Gento Zenebi: "Why I Have Started Again To Listen to Voice of America and To Watch Foreign Television Stations"]

[Text] When the Workers Party (PPSh) was in power and Albania was under one-party rule, we all knew that the television was under the censorship of the party-state and only broadcast cheerful news, as if everything glimmered in Albania and was always improving. Even the occasional critical news item that might appear was edited and checked several times. The party's censors excused any criticism that was raised, lest it upset high circles. Any word that threatened the authority and rule of the dictatorship of the proletariat was erased.

However, with the establishment of pluralism in Albania and the victory of free speech and a free press, our television began to speak more openly. It could even be said that exaggeration became the television's main artistic resource. Strikes and assorted crimes took up about two-thirds of the news.

With the victory of the Democratic Party on 22 March this year, the situation "changed" at once, on 23 March. The "new day" began, as if life in Albania had begun on 22 March, as it did on 24 November 1944. We "inherited" from before the liberation nothing but the sea, while we have now "inherited" from the last 50 years nothing but the dark night of communism! This is the behavior of nihilistic and epistemological politicians, who ascribe all good things to their own rule, and all evil to the predecessors. (They say that the devil is not as black as he is painted, and that even the sun has its spots.)

But let us not leave the subject. The television now describes the political, economic and social situation of the people as again tranquil, without specific daily problems. We see almost nothing of the problems and concerns of working people about resuming work, living conditions, and coping with difficulties. There is nothing about the acute problems of the countryside, where television cameras still do not penetrate, and when we all know the plight of Albanian villages. The 1 May programs on the radio resembled the highly-polished broadcasts of Enver's days.

Let me mention another case. On 4 May I saw on RAI-Uno (Italian Television's First Channel) a program in which the Italians showed the exhumation of Enver Hoxha and the other 11 former leaders. RAI-Uno showed their disavowment from the Martir's Cemetery and their refusal to be buried in the public cemetery of Shkerr. However, what did our television provide? Only a curt announcement of 10-15 words that did not even tell us who had made the decision. Italy provided the information that the exhumation took place at night and that the refusal was before dawn, at 0600. Tirana Television did not say a word and showed no film.

The Voice of America also broadcast a short interview with Mr. P. Arbore, while our radio and television maintained a monist silence.

Even other foreign stations provided liveliest commentary. Again, Tirana Television maintained a monist silence.

Concerning the refusal of Myslim Peza in Peze, it was not mentioned at all. On 4 May that the government had dug a grave for him at Shkerr, but that his bones were carried to Peze at the insistence of his relatives and an empty grave was left at Shkerr. Not did our television either mention or film the scene at Peze, where villagers, veterans, Father Myslim's comrades-in-arms, and a group of Socialist deputies had gathered. A stranger business, a close friend of mine said with pain. This was once the style of the leftist PPSh, but is now the style cultivated by the rightist PPSh.

I would gently suggest that we should never revert for any news item to the euphoric and perfumed style of the single-party system. People always want the truth. When the truth is concealed, it only spreads faster. Do not forget what our people say. The truth flies off and lands somewhere, and you cannot find the sun with a sieve.

So, now that you have begun not to provide information or to be circumlocutory, not only I but others have again begun to listen to the Voice of America, as in 1965-67, when it gave us the necessary information, and to watch foreign television stations to find out what is happening in Albania today. What a shame, friends, gentlemen, and colleagues! Please do not commit this sin and do not create it as an opponent to our own television station, which should be Albania's favorite source of information.

### Silence on Theft of Revolvers, Machineguns

41.18058074; Tirana ZERI / POPULLIET in Albanian  
8 May 92, p. 1

[Article by Fehmi Kocur: "(10) Revolvers and 35 Machineguns Stolen"]

[Text] A few days ago, an armament depot was looted in the area of Lekeok. The robbers managed to steal 10 revolvers and 35 machineguns. The event is shocking. The criminals and delinquents did not steal these arms to play with them, but to terrorize the people. And 145 armed delinquents is no small number. Nevertheless, everyone is now keeping silent about this dreadful event. The spokesmen of the Ministries of Defense and Public Order remain silent.

Until yesterday, we would see on television a delinquent attempting to rob an empty shop. That was a very good thing. The world and European press do not hesitate to publicize these events, as far as we can follow them. Is it not sensationalism? If we still think the same, that is a crazy mentality and practice. We should soon democratize ourselves from it. Many shocking events, such as arms

looting, murders, etc., that have occurred after 12 March are hidden, especially by the television. The "river" of crimes that flowed across the television screen before the elections were intended to say: Look, the socialists are incapable of governing the state; they are unable to establish calm and public order.

Are there fewer crimes now, but perhaps more ugly and dreadful? If we had wanted to politicize the problem and the event in Erseke, we should have said: The new government members are unqualified and incapable of establishing order, though they promised to do so within 24 hours. No one but delinquents and law-breakers emerges victorious from this "war" of party fighting. The socialists would never like to fall into such "traps" often instigated by the press and oral propaganda of those in power. They call on everybody to stand against crime and vandalism. The people and the country can wait only in this way.

Whereas today we keep silent and do not inform the public about such an event, "Why? Out of neglect, to keep a secret, or not to create trouble for the directors of both ministries? Gentlemen who are in power? This working method belongs to the museum of the previous time. Dissociate yourselves from the past with deeds and become transparent as democracy wants you to be! The people want to be informed about events and to discover the authors of this crime. These are 145 firearms and not wooden arms.

#### Socialists Attend Reburial of Communist Veteran

AL2505070542 Tirana ZERI / POPULLIT in Albanian  
6 May 92 pp 13

[Article by Shkëlqë Valtore: "Future Generations Will Call Him Father"]

[Text] Peze, the village of battles for freedom and independence, patriotic Peze of genuine democrats, Peze of the first organized band in the struggle against fascism, Peze that was burned three times by the invader and the country's traitors, legendary Peze of the Conference and of Father Myslim and other good and honest men will never forget the afternoon of 4 May 1992. It will never forget this day because as never before in its history and the history of all Albania it witnessed an extraordinary ceremony: the reinterment of the bones of Father Myslim [Myslim Peza, 1897-1984, wartime leader and long-serving parliamentary deputy].

Pain says the spirit, but no force can bring you to your knees when you are honest. The sorrow at the exhumation of Father Myslim and his wartime comrades therefore did affect honest people and touched them to the heart; the conscience of the people was this time subtler, kinder, and more convinced than that of certain politicians.

The people of Peze assembled in front of Father Myslim's house in order to do honor to him and themselves. A simple but moving ceremony was organized. The

majesty of this ceremony lay precisely in the nobility of the assembled people in their silence and in their generous souls that are able to forgive even such unheard-of adventures.

"I grew up with Father," said with pain Myrteza Kacaj, an honored veteran and a brave former partisan of the Band of Peze. "I have never heard of the dead being exhumed from their graves before. Even when the Italian state sent its representatives to fetch its war dead, the exhumation was done with Albanian honesty and not like the work of thieves in the night. Father Myslim was either not killed in the war and was not declared a martyr, but he was the commander of many martyrs."

The 77-year-old Xha Myrtaza falls silent for a few moments, and continues:

"Father Myslim's family never let the guns fall from their hands when it was a matter of the people's freedom and independence. Father Myslim was like that himself. He fought against the Turks, against Zog and his lackeys, against the fascists, and against the Nazis. Yet the day comes when they say to him, 'You're not a martyr!'"

These are affecting words. You hear people's distress at what they all say. Neither Muharrem Kundra, Beshtet Durraka, Gani Kula, nor Rexhep Ramazani is able to excuse the exhumation of the 12 men.

The coffin with the bones of Father Myslim lies in a room of the house in which the Conference of Peze was held on 16 September [1942]. It stands in the middle of the room covered with a red flag with its eagle and the Red star of the freedom fighters. Around it stand comrades-in-arms, fellow-villagers, members of the family, and veterans who have come from Tirana, Durrës, Diber, Kavaje, and Rrugëthene. Comrade Fatos Nano, chairman of the Albanian Socialist Party (PSSH) Managing Committee, Comrade Gramoz Raci, PSSH deputy chairman, Comrade Kastriot Islami, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly in the previous legislature, Comrade Dëshmorë Peci, deputy chairman of the National Committee of War Veterans and Invalids, deputies of the PSSH's parliamentary group, members of the PSSH Managing Committee, and Eurosocialist young people come to pay their respects to Father Myslim.

Hasid Lleshi, Father Myslim's close friend, three-times commandant, and hero of the people, was also present. The generations were united, and brave men joined together to honor the legendary hero. By honoring Father Myslim, we honor an entire people, we honor the blood shed in the great war, and we honor Albania. It is therefore proper for us all to address Myslim Peza with that beloved word, father. That is what we always used to call him, and that is what we will call him in the future, down the generations.

# Article Urges Production To Stem Inflation

AL 7/05060992 Tirana ALTERNATI 4 SD  
in Albanian 15 May 92 pp 2-4

[Article by Fagim Ibrilo "The Need To Staunch the Hemorrhage of the Lek"]

[Text] The population density per square meter is higher in a square in the center of Tirana with an area of less than one-tenth of a hectare than in any other place. The movements of customers, vendors and anxieties, supply and demand, the devaluation of the Albanian lek—these are all things that follow ever harder on each other each weary day on the battlefield of the free currency market. The expected has happened, and the exchange rate of the Albanian lek has fallen to 100 to the dollar. The devaluation of the Albanian lek continues, like a marathon without a finishing line, in which the value of the lek drops and we grow poorer ever day. However, neither the punch of land nor the clients who frequent it are to blame for this. What is happening here is the will of the laws of the market economy, in which the unrevocable laws of supply and demand operate in their purest fashion. They recognize no state decrees, shed no tears at the impoverishment of some, and do not rejoice at the profits of others. In the marathon devaluation of the lek, the eye of the economic analyst can gauge the state's economic power and discern an extreme form of economic collapse, in which the state long ago ceased to act and unfortunately still has not awakened from its lethargic sleep to exercise its protective functions. This process has been accompanied by catastrophic consequences for the people, the state, and the national economy. The hemorrhage of the lek plunges the people into ever deeper poverty. This impoverishment extends to all economic indicators and reaches into every cranny of Albanian life. Monthly salaries are now \$4-\$5. Real earnings have fallen significantly as a result of the drastic eight- to 15-fold price rises. The trend of this economic collapse is toward the destruction of the entire Albanian economy, and it seems that this hemorrhage will kill even those who now rejoice at it.

Of course, social and economic reality must and can halt this snowballing avalanche. This can be achieved if the state and its specialist bodies intervene in economic ways to influence the factors that first caused and are now perpetuating and accelerating the hemorrhage of the falling lek. The exchange rate of the lek is among other things dictated by the rate of inflation in the Albanian economy, the state of equilibrium between the supply of and demand for foreign currency, and the power and scope for activity of speculators. Today's social and economic situation and the continuing absence of an effective response by the law-governed state and its specialist bodies to the consequences left behind by Albania's phantasmagoric economic career still encourage the malignant tumors of the aforementioned factors.

The graph of inflation is heading toward a high peak, and every day scales new and unprecedented heights. The government has declared a war on inflation, but there can be no war or victory without firing the engines of the economy. A dead engine merely means subjection to and defeat at the hands of the monster of inflation. It is therefore vital to start producing goods. This is not only one of the pillars of the existence and progress of society, but lack of production is also a basic factor in encouraging and maintaining high inflation. The Albanian lek sits like a lead weight on one side of the economic scales of money versus goods, and continues to tilt the balance to the floor. Only domestically produced goods placed on the other sides of these very delicate economic scales will rescue the economy from inflation, the Albanian lek from devaluation, and the currency's poor users from the anxiety and insecurity that has now seized them. We ask the government to spare no means in stimulating the production of goods as soon as possible. There is not the slightest doubt that such an initiative would greatly facilitate the conduct of the economic reform. It is not as impossible to start producing goods as it seems or as some specialists, journalists, politicians, and officials assert. Private or state agricultural and stock-raising farms have virtually every condition for production. From today on, no land should be fallow. State bodies, banks, and other institutions must exercise their vital economic authority, forging a saving alliance with this important sector of the economy. One could say the same of other important sectors of industry, services, or transportation, which are state-owned and state-funded, but where earnings are openly expropriated. It is difficult if not impossible to carry out the economic reform if the economy remains paralyzed.

The growth of the money supply, which is not covered by the necessary increased volume of goods on the domestic market, has been and remains the second factor that continuously stimulates inflation and simultaneously leads to the devaluation of the Albanian lek against foreign currency. The uncontrolled growth of the money supply has turned inflation into a mythological monster whose tentacles squander and destroy sections of Albanian society. The growth of the money supply must therefore be restrained. This will be an effective measure only if it is rigorously enforced through economic channels and mechanisms. In mechanical terms, it means defusing the devastating bomb that the governments of 1989, 1990, and 1991 left as a souvenir to Merko's government. Reducing the quantity of money put into circulation implies freezing wages and blocking transactions and services that require cash payments and pave the way for acute socioeconomic problems. This will create a difficult situation that the impoverished masses of the people will find hard to support. We cannot therefore start by freezing wages (as we should not start this way, because that is where we will end up if we do not act fast), but should apply other measures that will not worsen but alleviate the people's plight. The new law on the banks and the banking system, which creates the opportunity of forming a monetary policy, also

permits the introduction of administrative measures that could fast results. Under such circumstances, we would suggest that banking practice should be to grant credit only for the purposes of production, in other words to encourage the purchase of the raw materials, machinery, and equipment that are required for production processes.

The granting of credit for mercantile purposes, and still worse for currency exchange, must be prevented by law for a certain period until the production of goods has revived and the economic reform has taken root. There must also be restrictions on the granting of credit for building or reconstruction, a measure that should remain in force until the priority of production above all other activities is established. The bank and all other relevant institutions must necessarily ensure that payments between economic partners are not made in cash as is the case today. This is a peculiarity of ours that is entirely avoidable. This must be done without hesitation, because, besides reducing the demand for an increase in the money supply, it would eliminate the available scope for corruption. Monetary policy should create opportunities for state or private enterprises that produce goods for the domestic market to also enter the free foreign currency market. This will enable them to obtain foreign currency in order to import raw materials without waiting for the state to provide it and without purchasing it from third parties, whether private traders or commission dealers. Such a monetary measure would greatly encourage the production of goods and would combat inflation in the economy.

With the present severe shortage of domestically produced goods, traders and consumers turn their eyes to the foreign market that accepts payment only in hard currency. This leads to a daily increasing demand for foreign currency. Albanian exports are a negligible source of foreign currency earnings, as a result, foreign currency is supplied solely by the earnings of illegal emigrants. The very high demand for foreign currency has led to the decline in value of the Albanian lek.

Production for export must be given priority as soon as possible. This will improve the foreign balance of payments and will add to our sources of foreign currency, thus helping its supply. The export of currently stockpiled goods, including even some food items such as olives, which have been misused, must also be encouraged. The noise of licenses and bureaucracy whose tight straitjackets do the economy so much harm must also be loosened. In taking these measures, government bodies should hurry to descend to the actual factory floor of the economy.

It would perhaps be useful for the banks to engage in the purchase and sale of foreign currency, because, as we said, emigrants bring this currency. It is precisely this currency that keeps the Albanian market afloat. If the bank were to absorb this currency at its real rate of exchange on the free market, it would not only become a source of foreign currency credit for the production of

goods and subsequently for investment, but would be able to eliminate the speculation on the devaluation of the Albanian lek that currently influences currency exchange dealings.

#### Trade Union Paper on Management Corruption

AL1505101892 Tirana SENDOKALISTI in Albanian  
6 May 92 p. 2

[Article by Vilson Qendro "Transition and Corruption"]

[Text] The massive phenomenon of speculation by former wielders of power has now become a tumor on the body of our modest wealth. It was made possible by the stagnation of the transition period, a stagnation that these people themselves created and encouraged with malevolent and criminal intentions. They were greatly helped in this by their Red clan and the single-party parliament and government. The revelation of abuses, or rather thefts, no longer surprises anybody. However base these acts may be, they are so common that they no longer make a real impression or disturb the authorities that should prevent, investigate, and judge such cases, such as the procurator, the investigator, and the Fraud Squad. If these do not act, who will stay the hand of these new capitalists, who are mostly either Red or have recently given up this hue and tried to become blue.

The strangest things have happened in the transition period in Albania, phenomena that did not take root in the countries of our fellow-sufferers in the East, or at least not to the same extent. This is not any fault of the Albanian people, who heroically endured the heavy burden of communism (if that is what we can call the system under which we lived). During this period, the communist leaders worked and prepared the ground, assisted in this by this people's extreme poverty. They succeeded in concealing the abuses and thefts they had committed by inciting mob raids on the storerooms of retail enterprises and on humanitarian aid.

A great deal has been written in the press about the situation discovered in the storerooms during the attacks of throngs of people. These warehouses stored goods that had been hoarded for years at a time when the market was absolutely empty. These leeches, after having taken what they wanted, incited the masses to seize what remained. Dozens of people lost their lives during these onslaughts, but what did that matter to them? Our people got to know about these incidents from the press and television. Can the devastation at Lac, Fushe Arrez, Pogradec, Lander, Lushnje, etc. be forgotten? It seems that the communists had decided to hand over a devastated Albania to a future democratic regime, without productive enterprises, and, worse, without hospitals or schools.

The fever of greed took root in a small section of the population, in the section that still had an opportunity to grow rich. This infectious disease then spread to the masses of the people. Which of the leaders of the



single-party era did not plot how to grow rich." Which of them failed to attempt, even by illegal means, to gain a little extra for himself? Appetite comes with eating.

State control was not only absent, but its operation encouraged matters further. Some Laborite leaders, in order to keep their noses clean, threw away their party cards and immediately joined the opposition parties. This step was the most dangerous kind of behavior, because it not only secured their immunity but infected the parties that gave them shelter and lowered their credibility in the public eye.

The Independent Trade Unions, both centrally and at the grass roots, have exposed many cases of abuse by enterprise managers, who, on the basis of the Laborite laws on privatization, bought for a song various installations of these enterprises for private use or in order to start private businesses.

Apart from certain special cases of the arrival of a legacy from abroad, managers were in most cases state employees with a fixed salary that was not far from that of a worker. In no way could they turn themselves into proprietors by buying portions or entire departments. Many of them, using business trips abroad and disregarding the purpose of these trips, forged connections for their own private interests and are now putting themselves forward as co-owners, purchasing one factory or another. Communist business executives now sell automobiles on the main squares of towns. Taking advantage of the stagnation created by the Laborites themselves, they also deceive workers by collecting signatures for the co-ownership of production. In fact, this production comes to belong to the managers, who also therefore pay themselves. Such cases have been found in various bread bakeries, retail premises, clothing production divisions, etc. The foreign trade enterprises should also be mentioned here. The managers, taking advantage of their key positions both in the ministry and the enterprises, are profiting by abusing both the goods and the sweat and efforts of the work force.

Nobody knows the exact selling prices of medicinal herbs, canned goods, etc. Looking at the movements of prices in the documents immediately implies suspicions of embezzlement, because the prices for our goods are always lower than those on the world market. The transition period, with our economy in a state of coma, gave our economic enterprises the opportunity to forge ties abroad. Of course, Laborite managers would be and were appointed to lead these delegations. Crusades set off for the West. Neighboring Italy and to a lesser extent Germany and France became playgrounds for these managers' abuses.

It must be emphasized that all these journeys were financed by the funds of the enterprises themselves, funds that were not able to keep the work force in bread. Now, after one year of galleyswimming, it is clear that not a single contract has been signed with Western firms, and the fault lies at our door. How could such agreements be

reached when the entire Laborite clan throughout the entire transition period worked for the very opposite goal, and encouraged the country's destabilization? Which firm would have risked its money in the marshes of Albania?

At first sight, these trips did not help either the enterprises or their tourist managers. The truth is however quite different. These journeys, as we now see, were used to create personal ties with foreign firms, which, to judge by their activities so far, are far from serious. One can unfortunately call them groups of speculators who, profiting from the wretched state of our people, come to fleece them even further. There is no other way to explain the fact that they only offer \$1 per day. Would a foreign worker accept this wage? Of course not. These then, are the investors who have come to Albania so far. This is only to be expected because an Albanian speculator would no doubt enrich himself to a kindred spent elsewhere.

Foreign investors will of course be necessary to revive the Albanian economy and to employ our people in the present plight to which we have been reduced. However we hope that they will be honest, industrious, and serious people.

In the new period on which we are embarking, thanks to the will of the masses of the people, we demand not only an end to the pay-offs of the 80-per-cent wage rate (wages paid to laid-off workers) and a start to production that will directly lead to lower prices for food and consumer goods, but, what is more important, we want to show Europe and the world that this people is ready to work, does not want to live on charity, and wishes to earn its own daily bread. The Albanian people want to show that it was not they themselves but the communist system and the caste running it that reduced Albania to this plight.

At all its meetings with the president and the new government, the Union of Independent Albanian Trade Unions has demanded the renewal of the entire administrative structure, because central power has no meaning without local power. Let us remember what befell Noli's government in 1924.

No economic reform could have been carried out or could have had any effect with the old administration in power. The renewal of the administration would help, especially psychologically, to restore confidence among the people. There can be no reform with communists or pseudodemocrats at the top.

The other demand of the Independent Trade Unions, for a review and inspection of the sources of the wealth of leading cadres in the transition period, is more than justifiable at the present moment. If communists went to join the ranks of new managers, the struggle to establish democracy would lose all its meaning.

### Trade Unionists Assaulted After Strike Threat

6L2005175592 Tirana SENDEKALESTI in Albanian  
2 May 92 p 1

[Report by SENDEKALESTI correspondent: "Strike Starts in Shkoder Today"]

[Text] The start and progress of work at the Adelchi-Albania joint enterprise in Shkoder has been watched by the entire public in our country as an example of the hope that cooperation with foreigners may offer. It can be said that this hope has so far been to some extent justified. The pace of work has accelerated fast, and the workers at this Shkoder shoe factory have been the first to receive more acceptable wages. Meanwhile, the "Albanian side" that represented the enterprise began to show a talent for "business" alongside Sergio Adelchi, and reduced the share of Albanian capital to 7 percent. However, other more serious problems for the work force were to arise later. From the start, the Adelchi firm paid \$5.60 per day for each Albanian worker, this was converted at the then exchange rate of 15 leks to the dollar and meant a real wage for the employees. However, as we know, the dollar rate is now three and a half times higher and is 50 leks to the dollar. The wages of workers at the factory have failed to take this into account and have remained fixed at 128 leks per day. This means that for them a dollar is valued at only 21 leks.

As the workers say, this is outright cheating, even though the Italian side continues to pay \$5.60 per day. Under such circumstances, it is the right of the workers to one every means to demand what belongs to them. However, their demands found no support, and they decided to go on strike on 2 May. They merely scuffled at the pressure of the young Albanian "businessmen," who claimed that all the Shkoder workers would be thrown on the street and that their work would be sent for completion to the Adelchi plants in Tirana, because strikebreakers will never be found among the democratic workers of Tirana.

It must nevertheless be said that "strange" things are meanwhile happening in Shkoder. Eduart Matari, trade union chairman at the new shoe factory, was struck with an as in the street one night as he was returning from the factory together with his fiancée. He was soaked with blood, and left with the threat that he would be killed outright if he talked again about the interests of the workers. The same thing happened to Ali Suci, another trade unionist at the factory. He was beaten up and threatened with worse if he did not "turn back from the road he had set out on."

With the aim of destroying the trade union at the factory and getting rid of its members, girls and women at this factory are being threatened and humiliated by the foul language of the "guards" of certain persons who lay down the law in the factory in the name of "the Albanian side."

On the basis of eye-witness accounts available to us, it is perfectly clear who these people are, but we have decided for the moment to follow the progress of this strike while "pretending" that we do not know who is organizing these wretched "unknown persons" who chase our trade unionists at night with axes.

However, we will not wait long. In our new feature, "Octopus," in our next issue, dear readers, we will acquaint you with the "king" of the carnal and the sick who has begun to terrorize the democratic city of Shkoder, opening new wounds, that are as painful as the old ones that have not yet healed.

### Thefts Impede Revival of Enterprises

6L2005112792 Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian  
7 May 92 p 1

[Article by Tahir Isildaku: "We're Being Robbed, the Director Says"]

[Text] More urgently than ever "Back to work" is the motto of the day.

A return to work now equals democracy. However, how can we bring people back to work when they have no work to do, when there are no raw materials, when there are no tools or machinery, and people's sources of enthusiasm for work are exhausted? Let the new government provide the answer, we hope as soon as possible. Our hopes lie in it. Nevertheless, there are people who work in one or two factories and agricultural enterprises where there is no shortage of raw materials, transport for workers, and goodwill. The Elbasan Brick Factory and some departments of the steel combine are in production. Work is being done, production is under way, and workers are paid well in the Wood Combine, the agricultural enterprises, and

"This pay would be higher," some enterprise directors told us, "if our production were not stifled." "Yes, yes, there is theft in broad daylight," some directors conclude, thus expressing a major and evident concern. Nevertheless, only expectation and despair at a solution to this problem follow this remark.

"Why should we work and wear ourselves out," a worker in the greenhouses near the steel combine told us, "when they come with sacks and steal our cucumbers?"

"Fourteen armed men came to our greenhouse yesterday," explains Ymer Jaho, greenhouse supervisor at the agricultural enterprise, "and they threatened us with being shot if we made objections. They entered the greenhouses, filled the sacks with cucumbers, and left in peace. Of course, we notified the police, who arrived, gave us advice, and departed, not forgetting to remind us, 'If the bandits come again, call us in time.'"

"And did they come?"



"These bandits come whenever they want. They steal as many cucumbers as they want and wander off undisturbed," Ymer explains. "They say they sell the cucumbers in Tirana and Korce. They sell our sweat."

"Do you know what the workers tell me?" Brigade-Leader Emine Alija says. "We work hard all the year and now the results (i.e. the profits) slip from our fingers just like that. Why should we still turn up to work? The will to work has since declined not only in our greenhouses but in the tomato section, where production is expected to be ready soon. They too are frightened of their crop being stolen."

As we talked, my mind wandered to the Pluralist District Executive Committee, whose door is guarded every day by up to four armed policemen. Why are these policemen necessary in the meetings, when the building is crowded with the clerks of the various sections? Whom are they guarding? Would it not be better for these policemen to guard the greenhouses from thieves? A host of questions come to mind, and there is no way that I can imagine that the police are incapable of nabbing the greenhouse thieves. What are the enterprises and their directors and management doing themselves, or do they consider their duty done when they report the crime and sit and wait?

As Ymer Jaho and the agnominist Fadil Tafa tell me themselves, four people are paid as armed guards for the cucumber greenhouses for each shift, i.e. 12 men in all at a rate of 100 lleks each per day. The continuing thefts show that these guards are paid in vain, and paid well, too, at triple the daily rate of a greenhouse worker. If we add the fact that the production costs of 1 kg of cucumbers are four or five times higher this year than last year, preserving produce from misuse, let alone theft, assumes a primary importance, because this is where rising production costs start.

Theft has another disguised appearance at the Elbasan Industrial Retail Enterprise. One fine morning, the goods in the warehouse are discounted by a "commission" whose members, consisting of a section of the management and the director Bushkim Cerina, who is now well known for profitable manipulation and intrigue for himself and his clan, buy the goods "for a song" in order to subsequently resell them privately at high prices. Brazen theft still takes place in broad daylight in the cement factory and the brickyard. Gentlemen of the management, step out into the free (or rather black) market one day and you will see how the goods stolen from your enterprises are sold.

"We have caught many of these wheeler-dealers who sell stolen goods," said Eduard Kula, district Fraud Squad chief. "We have taken inventories of the confiscated goods, but our personnel have been subjected to many threats. Can one work in this way?"

Yet we ask for people to return to work. This is an imperative of the times. However, just as we need raw materials to set our factories in motion, we equally need to protect production from theft and to provide safety

for people so that they may work in peace in these tense times. Otherwise people's flickering or newly kindled desire to start work will be quenched again, because the sweat people shed in indissolubly involved with the gain they expect. If the expected gain is small, the desire to work will be similarly small. This is beyond dispute.

#### Article Calls for Radical Army Reform

AL 2705085992 Tirana ALTERNATIVE (SD)  
in Albanian 28 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Major Radvan Zetka: "The Reform in the Army Cannot Be Carried Out by Those Who Do Not Want It"]

[Text] The structural reform should first start from the ministry. The ministry should not have excessive staff, as in the time of Murra and Mustaq (former communist defense minister and Army chief of staff), but should assume a new form. It will become more maneuverable and effective if it is divided into military and auxiliary departments consisting of six or seven directorates and two or three sectors altogether. The two main pillars of the General Army Staff should be the Directorate of Operations and Military Training, which should be made up of specialists in tanks, engineering, chemistry, communication, and topography, thus avoiding the need for special directorates. Alongside these two very important directorates, we should list the Artillery Directorate including armaments and ammunition, the Directorate of Investigation and Information, and the commands of the Military Fleet and the Air Force.

I think that the Assistance Department should consist of the Support Supply Directorate and Military and Vehicle Industry Directorate, the Staff and Organization Department, and the Education and Culture Department.

I do not know what troubles the gentlemen of the Tank Directorate are causing for themselves, when it is quite evident that the tank units are under the command of the operational units.

If the ministry's staff is going to plan this structure itself, they will behave in the same way they did with the promotion criteria and the salary scales, taking the lion's share for themselves.

It would have been more fruitful if a working group made up of capable and conscientious officers from the Academies of the General Army Staff and military units, former prisoners of conscience, and some member of the Retired Military Servicemen's Association had planned this structure under the direction of the defense minister. The general commander in chief would then have to approve the structure.

If this is left to the ministry's staff, we will go round and round in a vicious circle and will end up where we started, as if by tradition. The appointment of the new defense minister is positive, despite the rumors spread about him for political reasons. He should not be left

completely alone to face the pressure of the apparatchiks. I have seen the fierce fighting and pressures that the bureaucrats of the staff exerted to rescue even one of their former positions. The operational units should have a trim, high-quality staff including represents of every arm of the services, arranged in four or five branches. They can thus more effectively understand and responsibility for the situation.

The most important matter requiring care and responsibility is the selection of military officials. Such examples as the mechanical transformation of commissaries into education chiefs make a mockery of depoliticization. The transfers from the Defense Ministry to the staffs of Tirana divisions or the sectors of other ministries were attempts to find a place on the payroll for friends.

It is paradoxical that the Education Department in the Defense Ministry is led by instructors from the Labor Party committee, and education in general is conducted by former secretaries of the Labor Party committees. They should understand that they should retire from military life, if they are not efficient in other military sectors. This problem, which has so often been treated by the press, has been abandoned and no one wants to solve it.

As regards appointments of military staff, tests should be introduced for every job. These tests should have primary requirements, such as education, school results, work assessments, age, research, and management and organization abilities in the previous post. We should also not neglect personal qualities such as devotion to work, honesty, and propriety, which are very necessary for the military serviceman. Regarding these qualities, a special emphasis should be placed on the general cultural background of the military servicemen. It happened that in the staff of one military unit, an officer of 25 years' standing and inhabitant of Tirana did not know when Tirana was declared the country's capital. Another officer from the military staff of Lac does not know where Albulene is.

We should employ all those who want to work, in order not to keep the military cadres on the alert waiting to see what will happen. We should provide the necessary legal provision for social security, in order not to cause significant social consequences for those who will leave regular service and be relegated to the reserves.

The rumor that certain age groups will be relegated to the reserves has no real basis and is not democratic. The older age groups include incapable Enverists, who vegetate with the evils the system cultivated in them, but also those who have dedicated themselves to work and who keep up with the times. In younger age groups, there are clever and energetic young men, but there are also others who, though trained to lead a brigade at school, are incapable of commanding even a company or a platoon or disciplining themselves and who hold little promise of becoming a military serviceman.

There are some Army cadres in poor health who cannot withstand the burden that the future will pose. It would be kind to relegate these people to the reserves and give them a special financial benefit, especially those who have served in the Army for more than 20 years.

I am surprised to see how several cadres introduced by Enver Hoxha in 1975 to save the party pyramid in the Army still eat the Army's bread. These carpenters and drivers with freely awarded diplomas from the Higher Party School and the Military Academy, together with the team of Prokop Murra, Koco Mustaq, Simon Stefan, and Xhelil Gjoni influenced the indoctrination of the Army. They were bulwarks against the democratic processes and with their line of masses theory, they are the main culprits for slackness in the Army, the decline in discipline, and the evils of their own party cultivated among military servicemen.

I think we should relegate to the reserves those who, after performing military service, worked in the economy for three to five years and were given the title of officer through back scratching and loudness. Today, they are almost at the level of privates. They were then recruited for the "urgent needs" of filling up the free military schools. Now they must leave their places to capable people.

Until 1968, the Joint Military School accepted students with seven years' schooling. The majority of them graduated from night school or high school by correspondence after receiving the title of officer. Some of these preparatory cadres, as they were called, graduated from the High Military Academy, even without completing high school. You can do nothing with these socialist paradoxes. Those without high school education should be relegated to the reserves. As regards the others, each of them should be individually examined.

Those who have graduated from the Higher Party School should pass through the sieve of a test. After assessing their military abilities, they should go to the position they had before dealing with party work.

I am of the opinion that all the appointments made by the Labor Party Central Committee from brigade commander and upwards should be reviewed to see whether these people can still stay in these places or not. It is well known that the first criteria of their appointment was their loyalty to the Labor Party. It is also evident that if you were an inhabitant of Lushneri or even married someone there, Mihal Busha, not to think of those above him in rank, could give you an appointment.

The legal education should take place alongside structural reform. This requires the presence of the juridical institutions within the joint military units, independent of the command. This fully protects the legitimate rights of military servicemen. There is no need for requests to create associations, such as that of the active military servicemen, whose initiator was unfortunately one of the most zealous activists of the "Volunteers of Enver" in

[Boggs] I cannot give drugs, because the work has not been finished. A general feature of admissions has been the concern by orthopaedic directors in the selection of illegitimate children.

### Controversy Over Media Law Proposal Escalates

K/100: *For Budapest: HCT, 3 IL, HCT/2/2/100*  
in Budapest ("Mag. C." pp. 76-77)

[Article by István Lakai: "Hungary: Media Law—The Smuggling of Paragraphs"]

[This] compromise, rather than many compromise agreements, were reached regarding a number of issues signaling the accomplishment of the various negotiating sides. In essence, this is the summary result of more than a year's work on the media law that was placed on the National Assembly's urgent agenda last Monday. The fact that Justice Ministry officials insisted on . . . the changes that substantially differ from the provisions agreed upon by the six parties is of far greater concern, however, these changes could prompt the opposition to vote against debating the proposal on the floor.

After months of scheming about the television and the radio world, it was somewhat surprising that in the final round of drafting waves of passions mounted highest not about issues related to the public media but concerning frequency allocation and the Radio-Television Office (RTH)—the newly, new institution slated to make decisions concerning the licensing of new electronic media. Two viewpoints were light-years apart also in this regard. The ruling parties originally perceived the RTH as part of the state administrative hierarchy, with its chairman appointed by the prime minister, of course. In contrast, the opposition started out by claiming that the independence of the RTH could best be guaranteed by confirming the chairman's appointment by confirmation resulting from the affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority of parliament. The combination of these two viewpoints produced a solution regarded as one of the most important political compromises reached in the course of preparatory work. Although the chairman of the RTH would be chosen and appointed by the prime minister, such choice could only be made from among competing candidates selected by, and enjoying the support of, a two-thirds majority of the RTH Social Council (RTH TT)—a balanced body from the standpoint of partisan interests. Based on this perception, a similar agreement would also be required to relieve the chairman from his duties.

But the issue of appointment and dismissal has undergone major surgery in the present version of the proposed media law, as summarized by the government, much to the chagrin of persons responsible for media affairs in the opposition parties. The appointment provision has been amended by granting veto power to the prime minister, i.e., by stating that "a new appointment must be announced if the prime minister does not wish to appoint any of the candidates offered." The compromise passage concerning the relief of the chairman from his duties has simply been retained by the government, based on the new provision the prime minister could dismiss the chairman while "aware" of the RTH TT's

view, but without its concurrence. In other words, the prime minister could exercise his veto power under the TT nomination procedure of the law, and, from a practical standpoint, he would have a free hand in relieving the chairman from his duties, according to SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) representative Miklos Haraszti in response to a HFTI VII. 414/92 (IASM) question. In Haraszti's view, this change actually smuggled back the Hungarian Democratic Forum's (MDF) original proposal into the law. FIDESZ (Federation of Young Democrats) Representative Pál Molnár says it that way. That solution forestalled, however, a referendum of what has taken place regarding the appointment of your chairman, and they left some basic questions as to whether the proposal is acceptable to the opposition.

All this is viewed differently by MDF Representative Ferenc Kulcs, chairman of the National Assembly Committee on Culture. In response to our question he asserted foremost of all that it was natural for the government to submit to parliament whatever legislative proposal one that did not necessarily agree (refuse) with the proposal developed by the subcommittee on the Press. To the contrary, in this instance the detailed preparatory work performed by the subcommittee should be regarded as unusual. And, insofar as the substance of this issue is concerned, the two-thirds majority requirement to confirm the chairman had to be offset by veto power and authority to make, between short of such provisions a situation could arise in which the RTH was unable to function, according to Kulcs. A situation like this must not be permitted to arise in an institution whose duties are expected to be primarily foreign, according to the committee chairman. In Kulcs's view, paragraphs that provide an imposed list of conditions for competing for and operating commercial television stations prevent political instability under the law, and these requirements can also be relaxed through the courts, according to Kulcs.

Despite this explanation, one need not be overly suspicious to recognize that the examples of Eimert Hankov and Csaba Csombay have behind the odd appointment and dismissal procedures, these examples served as "warnings" to the government that even if it was possible to reach a consensus for the appointment of a nominee, it would be difficult to obtain a two-thirds majority to support the possible dismissal of an incumbent chairman from a body that consisted of three ruling-party representatives and three opposition representatives, in addition to representatives of the professions. This, of course, provides a good reason from the standpoint of the ruling parties to find a different solution, but the opposition believes that going into the other extreme and increasing the potential of the government to influence the affairs of this politically rather sensitive institution is not the best method.

Contrary to what they thought of the chapter dealing with newly established media, interested persons regarded part of the proposal that dealt with the Hungarian Television (MTV) and the Hungarian Radio

(MR) as a "good foundation" for debate. This of course should not be understood to mean that there were no differences in opinion regarding several attending issues. For example, the ruling parties insisted so strongly on installing the president of the MR and the MTV based on the infamous "appointments law" only to mean the opposition surrender in the end. Both sides act on the basis of different considerations, of course. The ruling parties might have pinned their hopes to the fact that the Constitutional Court has substantially curtailed the appointment power of the president of the Republic and has rendered that power a mere formality, and that consequently the real decision would be made by the prime minister. On the other hand, the opposition might have pinned its hopes to Árpád Göncü saying "no" in the end if that became necessary. At the same time, however, Miklós Haraszti regards as highly contradictory the fact that although the boards of trustees of the MR Public Foundation and the MTV Public Foundation—formed to establish the MR and the MTV respectively—would be the employers of public media presidents, these bodies have no say in the appointment of presidents. (HETI VILÁGGAZDASÁG: 18 April 1991). In Haraszti's view, a situation in which the boards of trustees of these public foundations, rather than parliament's Committee on Culture, as designated by the appointments law, would approve the prime minister's nominees—with a two-thirds majority, if possible—would be a rational compromise. This would represent a proven guarantee for the independence of the MR and MTV presidents in Haraszti's view, because as compared to the relative strength of the various parties seated in parliament reflected in the composition of the Committee on Culture, both the ruling parties and the opposition could delegate three representatives to these boards of trustees, and the remaining five, preferably nonpartisan, professional members could be elected by these six persons. The SZÉPSZ representative also complained about the lack of a requirement for the MR and MTV presidents to concure with the choice of two vice presidents mandated by the appointments law. Péter Mészár of FIDESZ—who has advocated from the outset that the MR and MTV presidents be named by a two-thirds majority of National Assembly representatives—has also been dissatisfied because as a result of the overly politicized character of the board, the threat of multiparty supervision over the public media arises. In fact, the boards of trustees would not be supervising business corporations established by the public foundations—a function the rejected alternative has called for—but instead, institutions funded by the state budget which have limited economic freedom and limited opportunities to obtain funds anyway.

Some other problems in the proposal, not primarily of a political character, have also emerged recently. One here and there is it possible to find deadlines in the proposal. Although the question of deadlines seems to be insignificant, it is by far not inconsequential. Haraszti demonstrated that if the adoption of the law, the main

media, and the institutions of the law organizations were to take place within the upcoming time period, and further, if the existing deadlines alongside the various mandates contained in the law were synchronized with the tighter deadline concerning the media's own administrative practice, the running procedures of a new commercial channel would consume three years at best. (i.e., a preceding market study could only be completed a year after the next elections.) Not to mention the fact that having a worse idea will necessarily mean that broadening operations can begin.

Despite the fact that parliament has agreed to place the legislative proposal on the urgent agenda last Monday, the first part of the schedule—the 150-day effective date of the law—is almost threefolded. If all goes well, general debate will begin toward the end of May, and the time limit that a report is required by the National Assembly before it begins its summer recess in late June is barely enough to complete the process. The reason for this is the plenty of detail of the proposal emerging from under the protective cover of the Subcommittee on the Press—which also includes some a few amateur university and radio experts—is hardly going to be limited to the few issues described above, which have aggravated those who have done the preparatory work, they feel.

#### Charges Against TV President Hankiss Detailed

(Szabad Magyarok 7-7 MPB, 11B1852/2)  
in Hungarian: 1 Apr 1992

(Article by: István Lázár. In Hankiss Notebook)

[This I am reading in the 30 and 31 March 1992 issues of 11 Magyar Közlöny, the simply documented article by L.F. entitled "Mentő Fél," but it could have been called "Hankiss Fél" just as well. The pages of the file issued to answer the question whether Hankiss is suitable for office. That is, incidentally, in the question that Prime Minister József Antall has referred to the National Assembly's Cultural Committee.

Regarding the version and nature of the investigation into his suitability for appointment, Frigyes Kálmán, the chairman of the Cultural Committee, made the following statement in PESTI HÍRLAP's reporter:

[The National Assembly's Constitutional Committee will have the first say, it must decide whether Elemér Hankiss, upon his sudden removal from office lawfully or arbitrarily against the law president,] Csaba Nádler. Only we receive the Constitutional Committee's report, we will hear the testimony of Hungarian Television's (MTV's) senior officials. We will be interested to hear their assessment of Elemér Hankiss's performance in duty. For we have to know what relations between him and his colleagues are like, how he has been satisfying MTV's organization, participating in the shaping of programming policy and overseeing of practical application.



Emeric Harkai was appointed president of MTV effective 1 August 1990. (Just introducing himself to his senior colleagues at MTV, he emphasized that he intended to create an independent, modern TV network that would meet European standards. He intended to have his presenters/presenters everything would be solved easily with MTV's new experts. On 1 August he issued a circular containing 10 questions from which answers for the board could see that there must have been presenters/presenters after all because the questions had been worded in prompt enough based answers. At that time he was still using MTV's new experts—then suddenly were not in supervising anything—in "producer" programs of professional reports. Professional public opinion experienced its first disappointment at the beginning of September when István Rancsó—he had arrived at MTV with the president and was immediately appointed managing director—prepared a "synopsis" of the studies of the television network's future but it was so selective and completely one-sided that it aroused a series of objections from "discontent."

Thereafter monthly passed in complete silence. Employees suspected that something was brewing behind statements by Harkai and Rancsó to the press. Murals within the institution deteriorated increasingly. A feeling of uncertainty and helplessness took hold of the employees.

Harkai's concept "Principles for Hungarian Television's Reorganization" finally appeared. It was dated 1 November 1990 and stamped "First Edition—Not for Publication." In it Harkai announced a guiding principle that he now has become one of the main causes of his ignominious failure. It read: "An efficient internal organizational structure must be developed similar to that of commercial TV networks. The goal is to create a television network that is commercial television in its organization and business strategy, but a public service in its objectives and quality." The essence of Harkai's concept is the perpetuation of all-round competition. Public-service television competes with the commercial television networks, public-service television (two programs, which are separate organizationally, economically and in terms of programming policy) competes with each other and the producer's efforts focused on attracting the specialized political officials, which are also commercial workshops, compete with one another for productions. That is the goal of the concept.

#### Harkai's Intellectual Fingerprint

This is the national public-service television model with which Emeric Harkai began the realization of a television network that was to be independent and European in terms of its quality and mentality. But was this still the concept of Emeric Harkai, the reorganizer and free thinking social scientist?

The July 1991 issue of *THÉSZÉK* (the MTV employees' magazine) published a report entitled "Is the Boss Free?" (opinion Regarding the Frequency Movement) on a

conference held in July 1991 and attended by 17 experts, politicians, and businessmen.

From that report we quote the following remarks by Miklós Harsanyi, member chairman of the SZDSZ (National List of Free Democrats):

"The SZDSZ fully supports the presence of commercial television while we are catching up with the modern world. At the same time the MTVA2 is aware that Hungary being a European country which will already remain slightly isolated as compared with European countries, we will not be able to rid ourselves of state-type television. To this extent, state television will have remain somehow a part of Hungarian culture, and it could offer cultural advantages of considerable dimensions. We need some sort of balance of the two. Moreover, Harkai's previous suggests that competition is beneficial. Therefore it is good to have two of everything. If there is state television, let there be competition within it, and let state television as a whole continue with commercial television."

The leader is required to pick out his members from world of Miklós Harsanyi's quoted remarks. For behind Harkai's idea is the state product of the minds of a liberal social scientist and of an independent financial manager together together, and has become the program for MTV's reorganization.

But let us examine what the MTV's professional bodies think of this, namely of "Principles for Hungarian Television's Reorganization." The following is an excerpt from the standpoint that the committees of the Hungarian Television (later adopted on 17 December 1990):

"To our knowledge, the plan lacks necessary financial and labor law guarantees. It is unwarranted and unrealistic to integrate programmers into the central staff in the first step in the reorganization."

"Although the concept completely disregards the program itself, we are obliged to call attention to the fact that without stable, regular, collectively organized work shops, MTV will become unable to operate."

Following is an excerpt from the standpoint that the leadership of the Television Programmers Association adopted on 13 December 1990:

"The general inconsistency of Principles is its failure to take the personalities of television work into account. It confirms to them work the programming and personnel staffs that are being organized under special economic laws and regulations within the framework of competition laws, and to confirm the essential individual responsibility for the program."

The following is an excerpt from the standpoint that the committees of the 11 member of Television Producers adopted on 15 December 1990:



"We are in agreement on the need for MTV's structural renewal, but our basic opinion is that MTV's most important functions, programming and production, are not even mentioned in the proposals for reorganization. However, MTV's highest managing organs and their structure, the hierarchical chain are discussed in fairly great detail."

The following is an excerpt from the cross-management program that the secretariat of the Television Programmers Association elaborated on 24 December 1991 and 2 January 1992:

"The reorganization must be suspended immediately. The offices of the editors in chief should continue their programming, to the extent that the thinking continues possibilities and program time allow. At the same time, a network of decentralized specialized editorial offices should be set up. As of January 1992, three offices—perhaps already as producer's offices—could assume functions of the offices of the editors in chief. By then the offices of the editors in chief could be abolished, without any hitch in programming."

The following is an excerpt from the 2 January 1992 cross-management of the 14 organizations participating in the Television Council for the Reestablishment of programs (TET):

"The TET considers the need for MTV's reorganization. But it establishes that the reorganization proposals presented so far essentially jeopardize MTV's ability to function."

#### Before Without Refrains

Disregarding the opinions of the professional organizations, Elemér Hankiss proceeded with full speed to carry out MTV's planned reorganization. On 7 February 1992, also in view of the already mentioned standpoint of the TET, the National Assembly's Cultural Committee questioned Elemér Hankiss about MTV's proposed reorganization. The several hundred pages of the minutes reveal that the members of the committee were full of misgivings. On 13 March 1992, in the debate on the radio and television bill's concept, the Cultural Committee suddenly realized that the new church "with full authority" at the helm of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television had set in motion, "without statutory authority," in Dénes Csörgő's words, a reorganization process that would confront the legislative branch with an accomplished fact. Warnings by the National Assembly's Cultural Committee and then by Prime Minister József Ács, to the media chiefs—that they must refrain from making irreversible organizational changes until the passage of the radio and television bill—were in vain. Csaba Gombár and Elemér Hankiss proceeded with full determination to put in place the new organizational structures, to cancel popular programs one after the other, to begin the uncontrollable squandering of public funds, and to hold a clearance sale of public television through questionable business contracts. Meanwhile the Office of the State Auditor General was conducting an audit at

MTV and the management grew entangled with increasing confusion. The situation of the organization's employees was becoming extremely uncertain and they began losing their livelihood. Production was halting, and editorial dispatches were breaking down.

In that situation and "in full awareness of their tragic effects" the 14 professional and other organizations representing the interests of 80 percent of MTV's employees wrote a letter addressing to a city for help, to President of the Republic Árpád Gönci, Prime Minister József Ács, and the National Assembly's Cultural Committee:

"As a result of its reorganization, Hungarian Television has practically become unable to function. There is complete anarchy in its organization and work processes, the losses are enormous. After a succession of errors and facts, a catastrophe."

"We turn to the president of the Republic, the prime minister, and the National Assembly's Cultural Committee with the request that they take immediate steps to prevent the complete disintegration of a national institution that is still publicly owned. Please help to remove MTV from the continuing and ever deeper crisis, so that there may emerge a truly public-service Hungarian Television serving society."

"We are willing to provide every professional assistance in that end."

"At the same time, the signatory organizations wish to distance themselves from any statement to any other body for political purposes."

It is noteworthy that MTV's professional collectives, denouncing themselves from any political intention, wish to act unequivocally on a professional basis in calling to the attention of the country's highest responsible officials and heads the considerable situation that Hankiss's dictatorship has created and is requiring a speedy solution.

#### Who Is One of Us?

Meanwhile Elemér Hankiss called an international "production" conference for 10 May 1992 by means of invitations posted in the corridors. (It was typical of the prevailing mood that someone corrected the word "international" [production] to read "international" [noise].)

The conference held at Studio TV began in a stormy mood and ended in a row. The first speaker, Péter Fehér, called on Elemér Hankiss to resign for reasons of incompetence. (The minutes of the conference were published in the July 1992 issue of TELEHIR.) The employees' anger was directed primarily at Csaba Gombár; in addition to Hankiss György, Kanizsai Sörgyei. "It certainly is not good when tabloids are published about a person in the press. We can have experienced that, thanks to Csaba Gombár's article. He was the first one in the Hungarian press to set us up as a disaster."

On this is enough, and particularly is V.G. Mr. Emeric Lakatos: "I think that blunders are being committed one after the other. It is questionable when MTV claims to be doing for lack of cash and ten months later again to double its air time. We want to be working against ourselves at every step. I will repeat what I said: Emeric Harkos is prime. I think he started out initially under the misconception that Gabor Barany has at his fingertips everything there is to know about MTV. The other big mistake was that he [Harkos] thought so too." The one snagged when at his contribution Gabor Barany stopped his colleagues is the fact with his arrogant self-importance and critical consciousness, he had been used from them out. Disregarding all democratic rules of the game, Harkos responded with a series of reprisals against most of the highest officials.

The Hungarian Television Chamber cannot be accused of being prejudiced, and it had not signed the letter of the 14 representatives, its standpoint, published in the 10 June 1991 issue of *NEPSZABADSAG*, read in part:

"We find that the processes which determine the fate of the most important mass medium have reached the stage where the threat of their becoming irreversible and permanently unchangeable is all too real. One proof of this is the daily erosion of equity without which MTV's operations cannot be imagined. The primary cause of the evolved situation is that to this day the government, the political parties, and parliament in general have failed to put in place the economic and legal conditions for television broadcasting.

"Another decisive element of this situation within the MTV is that its president and his immediate associates are by now demonstrating unsuitable for managing the institution and are unable to control the processes they set in motion. As a result, they have become isolated and have lost their authority.

"We deplore the MTV president's crude, personal and unjust attack against the top officials of the Television Workers Trade Union. We consider any attempt to interfere in the game of a political threat the disintegration and professional management of the president and some of his associates, which in itself contributes toward making the institution a scene of political skirmishing."

The next day *NEPSZABADSAG* published an interview with Peter Barany, the president of the Hungarian Television Chamber, by Gyula Varsanyi. The following is an excerpt from that interview:

[Barany] The situation is deteriorating gradually. The president pretends to be above it all. He starts out from excellent theoretical schemes and is unwilling to take into consideration that the final objective after all is the production and broadcasting of specific programs. The president's reorganization plan presupposes a market structure and a regulatory regime that do not yet exist. The president has admitted that continuously his economic approach does not take talent, knowledge and experience adequately into consideration, is either

naive, admitting that is the most important a programming program. It is a different matter that, in his opinion, that is just a temporary disaffection and every thing will fall into shape again.

[A speaker] But you people have sensed that the political processes is dangerous.

[Barany] Yes, increasingly because he has put the institution's operating mechanism out of order. MTV was a mechanism to push through changes at such speed? Who has to turn everything? And why is it now necessary to manage by presidential decree?

Reading L.F.'s media file, one must sadly conclude that had there been the least bit of progress in recent months, the situation would not have deteriorated to where the prime minister is forced to raise the question of Harkos's suitability. I wonder when the politicians will notice the falling coefficient and the opposition will all come to realize that they made a mistake in July 1990 when they chose Emeric Harkos, the greatest political scandal that an independent MTV president and terrible manager.

It is interesting that many reports—from Emeric Harkos's case (dated 20 June 1990), which he submitted to the National Assembly's Culture Committee at the time of his leaving post as his appointment:

"My primary goal is to start a process of change that will produce within a year or two a Hungarian television system of high quality and European standards, able to compete also internationally. In other words, a system that provides truthful, impartial, and responsible information, offers entertainment of high quality, and fosters Hungarian and European cultural traditions.

The undertaking was or now have elapsed. Let the reader and the millions of viewers decide whether anything has been achieved of the set objectives.

### TV President Emeric Harkos Interviewed

O.N. 2001/24 Budapest, M.M. 7.08.1991, 17  
in Hungarian 1/- 400 47, p. 2

[Interview with Emeric Harkos, president of Hungarian Television, by Andras Bartha, place and date not given. "What Should Be in the Dock"—first paragraph of M.M. 7.08.1991 introduction.]

[Text] It seemed to be the case in the case of the Hungarian Television (MTV) affair, it should be the right wing of the MCF (Hungarian Civic Forum), the national and political group within MTV that is attempting to create control, claims Emeric Harkos, the president of MTV. Before his departure last Saturday for a two-week stay in America, he gave our paper an interview. Commenting on his relations with the prime minister, he said: "Perhaps today our concepts regarding certain elements of the democratic political system are already different and that too, may have contributed to the

general conflict, which is a legal conflict rather than a personal one." According to Huszár, the attempt will not influence the parliamentary development, and it will be possible to conduct the common business as usual.

[GATA:] You are drawing political issues from just an opening for America, while here at home a parliamentary investigation is about to start. What kind of situation do you expect to find here on that issue after an absence of two weeks?

[Huszár:] I spoke with László Székely, the chairman of the Constitutional Commission. The hearings will begin next week at the earliest and could drag on for several weeks. By the time I return two weeks later, we could very well be at the same point where we are now.

[GATA:] Since Hungary and there after the "biggest war" and within the ruling parties over former attacks have chilled from Hungarian Radio to MTV from 1 radio Channel to Eastern Europe. What could have caused this shift?

[Huszár:] There are or could have been several reasons. Since December 1990 contact within the ruling parties have been increasingly diminished, with the government. For there the fact that a few months ago I launched *Evening Review*, the second TV news program, was probably the last straw. A contributing factor might have been the further worsening of relations in recent months between me and several of my colleagues. For instance, the relations of József Károlyi and Ferenc Gyurcsány, to my knowledge, are in close contact with the aforementioned circles. I think it is very likely that the animosity and suspicion of these colleagues also played a role in the launching of the present attacks. In my knowledge, they do not even deny this. But it is they who might be he asking about this.

[GATA:] The attacks are directed against your person, but what is actually at stake here is MTV's independence. Let us assume that Eastern Europe is replaced. Will it then be possible to guarantee MTV's independence?

[Huszár:] This would depend on two things. First, on the new Media Law. If it emerges as a good law, then it will guarantee—at least legally and formally—MTV's independence, partially of the government, and partially of the ruling parties or any other political party or political force. That would be a guarantee that MTV's independence. That would be a guarantee, regardless of who coming eventually will be promised, regardless of who in the present is. Of course, much will depend also on the person of the chairman. Everywhere in the world, the person and individual greatly influence functioning in terms of institutions. The second condition, therefore, is that the parliamentary parties find and agree on a person who has the confidence, as well as the moral courage and nerve, to meet any attempts at influencing him.

[GATA:] Thus we have a real conflict, further intensified by the fact that the legal and institutional situation are not

meant to be resolving. In addition, the other one is the tension between the president and the president. It is good that the conflict has surfaced, but not sooner.

[Huszár:] Yes, that is true. This dispute originated from an existing, ongoing Hungarian proceedings against Vice President Székely. Here in Hungary, in the knowledge, the courts are the last resort for the resolution of such other disputes. It would, from professional opinion, may be important in this matter. I deal with matters like suggestions about presidential's opinion and action, and when considering the Constitutional Commission will advise. The conflict is good because the rule of the game will be clarified. As an example, I will cite mainly one point that needs clarification. According to Law No. 4/1990 on Supporting the President of Hungary, Radio and Hungarian Television, the president must be politically independent. That is, it means a complete absence of any external influences of a kind which might be seen—here, for instance, by my opinion, that the government's reports considered that they do have the dispute that must be resolved—that the government's dispute over the president of Hungarian Radio and Television, respectively, extends to its ability to guarantee MTV's independence against them at all. There is no question, therefore, if it is possible that parties, that would give the government opportunities to influence them. What is in fact would diminish conflict with the higher-order authority, with the law that already exists and would be to guarantee the president's independence.

[GATA:] According to your opinion, the result of such trouble is that MTV's essential basis of independence and procedure are not made, although the press freedom has repeatedly urged their independence.

[Huszár:] That is not too bad. It is not an environment, but first of all, what we thought were good rules of independence and procedure. The laws draft, the fourth and, was submitted on 10 March. We have done something possible to have rules of independence and procedure, but not entirely independent is also it not work. I honestly hope the fourth draft will be approved. The government has the right and duty to remove the rules from the viewpoint of legality, and then to approve them or to withdraw approval. But the government, I believe, has authority to remove the substantive guarantee. That was could be one of the reasons of the dispute. I do not think that have been mentioned, primarily, because the definition of the vice president's powers had not been specific enough. The question here was: what are president's powers, would eventually be the "yes" or "no"? Not knowing the extended number of vice president's, it was very difficult to define their powers.

[GATA:] That was dispute with Vice President Székely being heard?

[Huszár:] The president's disciplinary complaint, and that has ended the suggestion. Dispute between an



(Hungary) I would not say that the situation is deteriorating. That is perhaps your opinion. Allow me to express myself with more modesty than that. Despite all its professional problems, *Árnyas* has improved considerably during the past 18 months, especially since *Égyszemély* has been running. The competition has been decidedly beneficial. That is one thing. Another thing is the natural intense resistance in Hungary today of several great political cultures side by side, and the question arises whether the social groups embracing different political cultures do not have a right to hear each other presented according to their own standards—up to a certain point that does not include the falsification of one's reports. Thus when I on Pálfi's news program continue a note on this is placed also by the fact that a significant proportion of Hungarian society finds the program's minority and language harmful and to its liking. That political culture tends to think more in terms of hatred than of victory. It uses the language mostly of late 19th century European nationalism, rather than of today's Western European ones, and it offers more scope for tradition and sentiment than for critical analysis. Of course, that in itself is nothing bad because such a political culture has its merit. But I regret that *Árnyas* has not made use of the past 14 months to help its viewers master late 20th century critical thinking. Yet they probably know as well as I did that Hungarian society is a far more complex organism than to lend itself to description merely with the program's "right" and "Hungarian people." There are some important categories, but they must be built into an intricate and complex social context. Every case of our program ought to help achieve this. My last comment is that I would find *Árnyas* more acceptable if it were speaking János Árkai's language and thinking in terms of his categories. What I find very unacceptable is that it speaks János Árkai's language and thinks in terms of his categories—especially without trying to work out more subtle and versatile.

(Spain) If I understood you correctly, you would find *Árnyas* more acceptable if it were openly pro-government and covered, say, János Árkai's thinking?

(Hungary) I would not accept its being pro-government, but I could accept if it were thinking in terms of János Árkai's political categories and attempting to cooperate with their help. Not to János Árkai's taste, but to the government's taste, but to the country's interest. The categories of János Árkai's thinking and political philosophy are suitable for interpreting Hungarian society's present state intelligently, actually and progressively. Although I do not wish to offend János Árkai as a person, I think that the kind of unconditional, passionate moralism packaged in demagoguery, which he with such skillfulness is able to use to help Hungarian society understand its situation, with obligations and opportunities now at the end of the 20th century, and to strengthen the changes demanding it.

(Spain) There is a continuous dispute between the prime minister and the MTV president. Is there also a personal conflict behind it?

(Hungary) I am not aware of any personal conflict and I harbor no antipathy for the prime minister. As I have stated earlier, he and I were close friends in the 1980's, members of a small circle. We largely hung on János Árkai's every word, because he had the best grasp of Hungarian political history going on, and in general of European history as well. Then we did not meet for a long time. I was pleased when he became prime minister, because he is a person of outstanding erudition who has an excellent theoretical knowledge of politics. Later on I saw that he is at home also in practical politics. During the past 10 to 20 years I have been closely involved in politics professionally. Perhaps today our concepts regarding certain elements of the democratic political system are already different, and that too may have contributed to the present conflict, which is a legal conflict rather than a personal one. I believe the 1990 program, the *Agenda*-*Agenda*, *Wissenschaft* model is democratic, and if I am mistaken, be well aware of it. That model is practically unique in Europe. It offers unusually absolute power to the prime minister who exercises full authority over the executive branch—as well as, in my own party—and over the legislative branch. The other European democracies guarantee much broader rights inside and outside their parliaments to the opposition, various ministers and secretaries of state, and members of the cabinet of the government's and the prime minister's power. They produce a varied balancing act and interaction between the government and the other democratic institutions. In East Europe, in my opinion, even greater emphasis ought to be placed on the Western European pluralistic model on the road to create the best possible in the process of limiting authoritarianism, mafia, mafia, mafia, mafia, and local government corruption and gross fraud and at the expense of the government's power. A great curse of Hungary's is that, central power during the past four centuries was almost too strong. The new democracy in a country such as ours ought to draw special attention to strengthening the basic ruling institutions, at the expense of central power. In this situation I believe that it is not so personal matter and not MTV's case that we defend and strengthen MTV's autonomy, which has successfully resisted during the past 15 to 20 years in the expansion which he introduced in parliament the nomination bill that eventually became Law No. 5 (1991). Prime Minister János Árkai argued at length that it was necessary for Hungarian Radio and MTV to become autonomous institutions. I can imagine that the prime minister was a tool for a foreign government in order to manage the transition, well. And think that the evolution of the society and character of governmental institutions must be defined for later. There is extensive debate on this in East Europe. Many people are saying how fortunate the Czechs were that Havel had been able to place the independent practically since from November 1989 until the the summer of 1991. And how difficult it was for János Árkai to have to govern with a completely multiparty parliament. It can be argued that a few hard-handed on the tiller when using such narrow means.



But I agree at least of having to accept the greater burden and the more complicated problems that are the consequences of democracy resulting from the demands of businessmen institutions during such a transitional period. Because in Central Europe there is great danger in every country that central power may become too strong.

**Qatar:** And how long will MTV President László Mátyás expect that burden and more than anything?

**Mátyás:** I am not regarding a concrete answer at the moment. I will resign voluntarily and gladly, and go back to the profession, where a good Media Law will have been created, and the parliamentary parties will have reached a consensus on increasing its autonomy.

**Qatar:** Another line of attack is that Hungary's state and independent are captured by MTV. Are which you are being put in the dock?

**Mátyás:** If that is the case for president, it may perhaps be the case for constitutional chief presidency. In spite of all the problems, the network's reorganization has been successful. Our economic results have been enormous. I hardly think there are many Hungarian institutions which have adapted to the market conditions as successfully during the past 14 months as we have. But credit for that should go to the economic managers, not to me.

**Qatar:** This conflicts dramatically with your own president's statement that MTV is innocent.

**Mátyás:** He must have said that on the basis of wrong information. MTV was not innocent then and is not innocent now. Despite the fact that our volume (as published) figures of revenue from the state budget has been frozen, I have already said that it will be even better if it also appears in print. But MTV's cost to produce one minute of program was 5,000 forints in 1990 and 11,000 forints in 1991. The planned cost for 1992 is 11,500 forints. That is to show a Hungarian one is production costs in an hour. In contrast to a cumulative inflation rate of 100 to 170 percent reported for the same period by the KSH (Central Statistical Office). And to the fact that television costs everywhere in the world have increased substantially faster than the consumer average rates of inflation. And we achieved this without laying off thousands of television workers. I could cite numerous other examples to reflect the reality and show that people are spreading and inventing without investigating the facts.

**Qatar:** Who is in the dock after all?

**Mátyás:** If there is a dock in this case—the question of my candidacy is irrelevant to the subject and opportunity to present evidence from what is essential—that the political pressure group within MTV might be to put in a dock is attempting to give evidence for itself.

**Qatar:** Should they already have?

**Mátyás:** The right wing of the MPP is popular and arrogant wing—I do not have exact concepts to describe them. I cannot call them a popular conservative wing, but because in my mind, this does concept comes to my mind, and I do not think this group resembles that name. This group has openly declared that it will support MTV. They are demanding the resignation, and that the MPP must have greater influence over the media than it now has. I am able to accept that any political group would like to gain influence over television. They are fairly major predators of this in every country. But it is obvious that pure political factor must govern the law. The prime minister asked me to resign, and again when, in the last step, he requested the National Assembly (Parliament) to investigate the situation. In my opinion, it will be possible to ensure the process continues. My duty within this is to defend MTV's autonomy, in the spirit of the laws and regulations that are in force.

**Qatar:** It was reported that those right to be put in the dock who are attacking MTV's independence and autonomy.

**Mátyás:** Yes. And democracy must be to be placed against those who oppose them.

**Qatar:** You are referring to the demonstration in March 1997?

**Mátyás:** Yes. The demonstration was there, I agree, in 1997, with whom I had up in prison. That is really not matter. But they were demonstrating on behalf of people who within MTV had been important under the former political system. I don't wish to name names or to offend anyone, but I must tell you what the general mood within the network is. When the new president was appointed at the assembly and those the persons gathered around them who seemed to want to establish their own power, the colleagues welcomed me back with the words "I know! The old party membership is back!" And then said this helped me when my friend had been party membership of MTV. A third one had been a member of the party membership for many years. The fourth had been the chief of personnel and then the head of the president's office for an hour, and a fourth one that their wife has persons have close links in the right wing of the MPP. It is ironic that the demonstration was demonstrating on behalf of people who actually had been against them under the previous political system.

**Qatar:** By being with them, and involved with them, is it true that you have in some sense and months in America?

**Mátyás:** I used only the official reason to go to America and did not require more. Without any formal order I had requested to go outside the fulfillment of my contract—showing what the prime minister and also hoped Carmel knew at the time of my appointment—because I felt that I had to be at MTV. Finally, in January of this year I was no longer able to participate in the department without commuting.



success in my professional life, and without unnecessarily losing my international reputation. Every scientist in the world would be happy to accept an invitation from the university where I will be teaching. I undertook to teach two half-semester of 10 weeks each. I have already completed the first 10 weeks. My contract has been cancelled. The university was entitled to cancel it because I am unable to fulfill the stipulated conditions. That is just not done to a

private university. In spite of this, I will still be giving three three lectures at the coming months, for two weeks each time. In considering the material, I will be able to complete my lectures. At present I will be temporarily here in Hungary. I have checked my own schedule with Ferenc Kalos, the chairman of the Cultural Committee. The lectures will be able to proceed as scheduled. I will be there. I have nothing to fear.

## KPN, History, Present Aspirations Discussed

KPN's 1st Annual TYGODNIK POWOZIEC (HNS)  
in Polish No. 15, 17, Apr 9, pp. 1-7

(Article by Marcin Cholewa, and Adam Nienkiewicz.  
"KPN, Confederation for an Independent Poland From  
Ministry to Twelfth")

[Text] The Fourth Congress of the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) ended a certain era, both in the history of the organization itself, as well as in the history of Poland. The organization changes its laws and leadership (although Leszek Moczulski still remains at the head). And Poland is already, in the leader of the confederation said, "substantially" independent. A law from the Legationary system was chosen in the congress's motto: "They said we are foolish, did not believe in us in the original in that I that is, want it to be able."

### Conference, Conference, Conference

One could encounter the first delegates, with party badges on their lapels, on the morning express train. They came from Nowy Sącz, Tarnow, and Krakow. During the trip they read GAZETA WYBUCZA, DZIENNIK POLSKI, KURIER I MEZCZYZNA, NIE WPRIEST and NIEDZIELA. "We are not an ideological party," it was said later at the Congress.

In front of the former CUP [Central Planning Administration] building, where the congress was held ("The hall and acoustics have been better days, but we are paying only 1 million zlotys [Z] a day in rent," it was said in the press office), it was already crowded. In order to get inside, it was first necessary to pass through the first line of defense. Then accreditation, and another check in front of the conference hall, this time more scrupulous. Identification issued by the head of the press office was not enough for the broad shouldered man. A press pass and personal identification were required. "There was a series of staged jokes about a bomb being planned. We did not want to be able to disrupt our congress," said KPN deputy speaker Dariusz Wojcik at the press conference. The guards behaved as if Leszek Moczulski himself might have one of those planning a bomb. During the entire congress a "shadow," identified as "Fourth Congress chief of security" accompanied Moczulski.

It began at exactly five to twelve with a standing ovation of several minutes and shouts of "Leszek, Leszek." More than 300 delegates from Poland and abroad greeted the KPN chairman. Three verses of "First Brigade" were sung (for those who did not remember the lyrics, the text was prepared on the fourth page of the binding of the congress documents) and the colors were presented. The latter guard was composed of young people in green uniforms and visored caps members of "Strzelcy," a paramilitary youth organization of the KPN, preceded by a uniformed Polish army colonel. "You can see what a beautiful affair we have," said Leszek Moczulski's son-in-law, Krzysztof Kozlowski, in the lobby.

### Conference Business

What happened afterwards did not differ much from similar events of other parties. The KPN chairman's speech, Moczulski spoke from memory for 45 minutes, the platform report, representatives of several parties. Chairman of the delegates disrupted the general harmony when, after the question: "Would any other of the parties like to speak?" he raised his hand, then proposed a resolution of thanks to Radio Free Europe and, as he said to national hero Jan Nowak-Jezewski. A small scandal ensued. Speaking among the reporters, Maria Moczulska, wife of the chairman and a delegate, exploded: "When my husband was sitting in prison, we insisted that information about it be issued." RFE [Radio Free Europe] was silent while Nowak-Jezewski called in from the indignation delegates said. Immediately, a 20-minute break was announced, after which there was no further mention of the alleged incident. No doubt with an eye toward avoiding similar incidents, the doors remained closed throughout discussion in the by-laws and platform and the elections. The most suggestive reporters lay in wait between the entrance and buffet for those leaving the hall.

The next day one could hear interesting things in the lobby. Indeed, the time of divisions and discussions among KPN members that occurred for various reasons—previous congresses had ended, but a protection force infected many delegates. At the buffet, the wife of here was a baited, even though there was still plenty in reserve. In various places, in front of the restaurant for example, one could see small groups of conspirators. There was talk of "cutting off Warsaw" about "international agreements" between regions. Only a group of young people, clearly isolated from the rest of the delegates, did not succumb to temptation.

The youngest KPN delegate was nine years old on 1 September 1979 when the Founder's Document of the party was read at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. In both the KPN Parliamentary Club and the new Political Council one can see more people under age 30. They have an excellent presence, superbly dressed, one of the youngest delegates, from Krakow incidentally, made an even bigger impression with a notebook companion on which he was busily reviewing a draft of the KPN bylaws. They do not resemble representatives of an "electorate of the disaffected." Leszek Moczulski will only emphasize that the KPN is the party of the future. And they are wrong. They state unanimously that the future belongs to them, and not just the future of the confederation. From the beginning of the Polish independence movement, of which KPN views itself as a perpetuator, much has already been decided there.

### "The Affair"

The democratic opposition did not like the Confederation for an Independent Poland, and the communist

leaders persecuted it even during the last days of post-August freedom. Tawers attacks through PRL propaganda and repression, the confederation operated in such an atmosphere until the late 1980's. Within the Workers Defense Committee opposition, KPN members had the reputation of "affiliated," independence-minded fundamentalists who took out their frustrations in overt, often violent, demonstrations because from the very outset, sense of patriotic anti-Russianism—it was hard—communism could not fail. Letting off steam in the "return of action" shared as much as did the paternal, early organizational structure of the KPN. Forming the underground resistance movement was seen as patriotic and offensive and dangerous besides, because it increased susceptibility to infiltration and persecution on the part of the SB (Security Service). The confederation did not remain indebted and accused the Workers Defense Committee circle of attempting to come to terms with the PZPR at the cost of discarding its fundamental objective attaining independence.

#### Falls and Rises

But after August, the KPN called attention to itself when the movement of committees for the Defense of Freedom of Conscience was developed in Poland. It organized under the banner of liberating KPN members arrested just a few months after the accords were signed. Mieczyslaw Sieremietiew, Szanski, and Landowski. Certain high school and college youth eagerly joined in the committees' work. The KPN also found room in its influence in the worker circles of Gdansk, Krynów, and Silesia. The consistent logic of the KPN's actions, which attempted to win members and sympathizers in such sensitive trade groups as freight handling and transportation, was noticed. The trial of the four activists began in June 1981 in Warsaw. The indictments charged them with attempting to overthrow the PRL system by force. The KPN leaders answered that their actions did not break Polish law—Wanda Falińska wrote in *TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSCI* (No. 17) that Mieczyslaw asserted he had always respect the PRL's legal system—since it did not forbid the formation of political parties and respected freedom of speech, assembly and demonstration. It was also difficult to see indictment to mass, since in the motto on the KPN's flag, "Revolution without revolution." "Polen, do nie jak hoiad," Leszek Mieczyslaw said years later, "it is the Russians that love to cut each other up." The trial went on past 11 December when the defendants were taken over by the military court, which in October 1982 sentenced Mieczyslaw to seven years, Sieremietiew and Szanski to five, Landowski to a two-year suspended sentence.

The KPN returned to the scene during the 1988 strikes, which its members supported. It broadcast the Round-table, but neither was the confederation involved in the discussions. It entered the elections in June 1989 independently. And it lost. Its leader voted for a deputy seat in Krynów. He received just under 11 percent of the vote, his rival from the Solidarity slate, Jan Rokita, received nearly 80 percent. Local elections came in May 1990. In

all of Poland there were 31,000 seats to be filled, the KPN won 3.11 percent of the vote. Mieczyslaw again lost in the most important district. A disappointed, seven-month later he changed the name for the *Przedsiębiorcy*. He and Jan announced resignation in a book for *Pracę Socjalną*, called "United Party" announced public statements. Announcements and independence—the two have already around which Mieczyslaw wrote his upcoming speeches to the nation—were viewed by oppositional circles as a common, misguided attachment. And once again Mieczyslaw lost utterly. Despite this he said with a smile that society would soon mature to the KPN's program.

#### Coming Out of the Shadows

Last year's elections to the Sejm and Senat were the starting point. From that point, traditionally, did not lose its original nature. For KPN won 7.7 percent of the vote and 71 seats in parliament in Krynów. Mieczyslaw took steps in Krynów. He won 10,000 more votes. The people had compared their performance before the elections. They were embarrassed to admit that they wanted to join the party outside Solidarity's camp. The secret of the KPN's successful campaign was apparently based on the fact that the slogan "Live as a chance" was their part of the traditional electorate. The voters believed that the KPN was an alternative to both the Solidarity camp and the postcommunism. The fact that it had operated for many years outside the mainstream of Solidarity proved to be a skillfully played trump card. The KPN had not "married itself" with power, and it was able to arouse untold hope for change. The KPN's constituency is composed of many professionally active men, age 25 to 75, primarily with a secondary education, employed in the public sector with not particularly high incomes (2 to 3 million). Every third one is a skilled laborer, every fourth a student of the higher school. It is also a stable electorate—nearly 80 percent of the former supporters of the KPN would vote the same way today—and active. They want to vote. It appears that the KPN is expanding its influence, but it is not going beyond the social groups that have been the party's base since the 1980's. One might presume that political radicalism will continue in these groups and in this sense the KPN is destined to continue its rhetoric, because otherwise it will lose its social anchor. For the same reason the real moment of truth for the KPN will be the hour of its entry into the structure of state power. From that moment the truth of its political rigidity will cease to operate.

After the announcement of the October election results, political and oppositional circles began to change their attitude toward the KPN. The situation was no better. Contempt and distrust were replaced by a mixture of anxiety and amazement. But the success was relative, as Leszek Mieczyslaw perceived. He said in an interview statement: "I will win this war because others lost a great deal and gained little. The KPN, which has not been in the Sejm, has only miserably achieved a great deal." In any event, trade politicians and commentators are in agreement that the confederation can no longer be

ignored them, even add that one can let a something down it. Although previously leading politicians still treat the KPN and its leader with suspicion, they are beginning to take it into consideration in their political calculations. The president of the ZLN (Polish National Union), the head of the PSL (Polish Peasants Party) and Professor Andrzej Bieda (former vice of the KPN Fourth Congress, Prime Minister Ostrowski) with a very warm letter and letters also came from Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Professor Giermek. The process of integration has now begun. While speaking Christensen, in his speech to the delegates at the KPN Congress, declared a significant consequence of opinion, his party colleague and head of the parliamentary faction of ZLN Stefan Niesiołowski, still views the KPN as an unpredictable party.

### We Are All Populists

The KPN slogan: classifies itself as a "populist" party. Inevitably Polish realists, this is neither a compromise nor a descriptive formula. Krzysztof Kruk returns that every party is populist because it seeks voter support. "We are the party of the independent movement," said "Commander" Mikulski himself at the congress. "The reporters call us Pilsudskians. To us Pilsudskians is something more than one can imagine. We are ourselves as well as many pupils. To us he still our commander although he is no longer in this world. But Pilsudskians do not say they are a Pilsudski movement. We are an independent movement and the center of state thought."

Who knows if the emotional use of these political declarations did not draw to the KPN the majority of its supporters. In that part of society in which the confused citizen's language and state of operation are aiming, there is a hunger that cannot be satisfied by formulas of pragmatism and responsibility for the state. They are too abstract, too washed of feeling. Independence and military symbolism and ritual are their opposites. One can identify with this personally. Attacks from the outside merely strengthen the spirit of brotherhood of action and struggle. Advocates of the thesis that after the fall of communism there is again rising a demand for politics that appeal to such elementary psychological needs as the need for community, a tribal leader, and a clear and simple casting of principles and watchwords that bring order to the world's confusion, can point to the KPN's slogans. One could call this populism, but such populism—the constant appeal in politics to "ordinary people," which it wants to represent and protect from the imagined or real manipulations of authority—has always been present in the political philosophy and practice of many Western democratic parties, the British Conservative, for example.

The trouble with populism is that, although it has a path in government, after assuming power it is faced with a painful dilemma. It is necessary to retreat from some or all of its promises or blunder ahead, i.e. attempt to make the best of them despite obvious contradictions or impossibilities. Both bring the threat of loss of public

support. That is why contemporary political parties must very careful use of this instrument. Only political debaters have to manipulate. Surely the KPN's leaders realize that this trap is waiting for them. But for now they emphasize that in the event of a conflict with the state, they are on the side of "justice." And they add that they have delegated 1100 activists to places of employment. (Officially their goal is supposed to be based on having wages amounts but are also also are in the more the considerations establishment of a bridgehead in the union movement and worker circles. Why? Well, that is the basic question. Since the KPN's main aim, first has—even in its post-upon-achievement, there can really be only one goal: preparing to assume power).

### Words, Words, Words

The numerous documents and publications of the KPN do not ignore principles of democracy and parliamentarism. In the contrast, a nonideological functionalism that respects civil rights and freedoms was discussed at the congress. Meanwhile, the KPN respects both the liberal and socialist state because both these systems want to put citizens to their use. On what is this temptation based in the case of a liberal state? To that the KPN says: It wants to build a state that serves citizens and at the same time is a community of citizens. These globs formulas are lacking in concrete, palpable substance as are generalities dealing with economic matters or foreign policy. The KPN's entire economic program boils down to the catch phrase "inflation of money," which takes as the springs of state industry the fight against recession and privatization. The confederation does not explain in certain that "created" or empty money will go where it is supposed to go and will not flow out into an unregulated economic system that imports inflation.

One can before their standard's motto, "Innocence" of the same lack of verifiable specificity. Their slogan is of the echo of the Jagiellonian idea, which peasants violate the national pride of many Poles. The notion of a community of goals and interests of the country that "freed themselves from Moscow's hegemony and out of the communist system" may also sound encouraging. But what is in this "Innocence" when Czechoslovakia is splitting at the seams, Yugoslavia has crumbled, Romania is fighting with Hungary, Poland with Lithuania, and all the countries of our region are jostling each other in the race to the fall in Brussels? When asked about details, Krzysztof Kruk managed to mention only the KPN's good contacts with the Lithuanian ambassador. That is not enough to make of our part of Europe another pillar of Pan-European integration.

The confederation has spoken far more extensively on matters of the system of government. Details of a minor and major constitution have been prepared, a bill on ensuring independence failed in the Sejm. The KPN's proposals on formation of the state wound attraction, in does unweaving the notion of responsibility, and the Christian nature of a universal source of values. But the

attraction is stated by article 41 of the KPN's bylaws, which state that "members of the KPN who perform work in organs of the government and in state administration may be granted leave from carrying out their duties in KPN structures, but they are bound to implement the political line established by the Political Council." Such an entry opens to us the field for conjecture that the state the KPN would like to build is, in spite of everything, a party state, not a "community of citizens."

Time will tell what the confederation is a "dark horse" for one political season or a lasting element of the democratic, multiparty system being established in Poland today. Krzyżtof Król is probably right when he answers that the verdict belongs neither to the KPN, nor to the reporters, but to history.

### Milewski on Defense Policy, Ministerial Structure

*W. J. Puchalski, Poznan WPRONZ in Poland,  
No. 17, 28 Apr 92, p. 22*

[Article by Jan Milewski, minister of state, secretary of state and of the Committee for National Defense, as well as head of the Office of National Defense "The Army According to Jerzy Milewski: The President's View"]

[Text] We asked Minister of National Defense Jan Parys and National Security Bureau Chief Jerzy Milewski the following three questions:

1. What is the practical application of the constitutional principle that the RP [Polish Republic] president is chief of the armed forces?
2. What changes in the MOP [National Defense Ministry] structure seem indispensable to you?
3. What should be the shape of Poland's current defense doctrine?

Jan Parys did not reply to these questions. Minister Milewski's statement follows:

1. The RP president is at present chief of the armed forces and chairman of the National Security Council (RBN), which is the organ of defense and state security. These constitutional entries define not so much the scope of powers as they do the responsibilities of the RP president for the armed forces and national security. The laws, however, fail to define the executive powers of the president, which make possible his influence over the matters for which he is responsible.

In the future model, which will be defined by the new constitution and other laws, the RP president should be unequivocally the highest supreme authority of the soldiers in the area of military command. To this end, we must expand considerably the powers of the president in military cadre matters and in the organization and training of the armed forces. The chief of the General Staff (SG) should be subject directly to the president in these matters.

On the other hand, the civilian ministry of national defense, subject to the chairman of the Council of Ministers (RM), should direct military life apart from development, handle both material and personnel procurement and implement the defense power (broadly understood) of the state in peacetime. The minister should coordinate important decisions both with the prime minister and with the presidential administration in the civilian MOP (Ministry of National Defense) would remain at the disposal of the minister.

The division of powers and responsibilities among the president, the prime ministry, the civilian ministry of national defense and senior senior officers after defense: the military chief of the SG must be properly adjusted to the powers of the RBN and the RM.

2. Back in last July, the RM made the decision to reform MOP. This decision should be implemented. The reform includes primarily: (1) separating the military ministry from the military system with the SG chief at the head. This would make it possible, among other things, to streamline the operation of the state structure, to reduce the number of employees and bring the army under civilian control.

The restructuring of the RP armed forces should begin in the first place, with the disbanding of completely unnecessary service units and the halving of those which remain from the old Warsaw Pact structure. The financial reserves freed up in this way may be used for the gradual development of territorial armies and for bringing in a corps-brigade organizational structure by the land-line armies. This outline constitutes the core of the conceptual draft for restructuring which has been developed in our office.

The current national defense ministry budget, which year-on-year makes possible this sort of restructuring, if it is fully implemented without any further cuts of the sort we had during the first quarter.

The army is aware of the enormous budgetary problems and it will do everything possible to make rational use of the funds received. A budget question is not a necessary condition for initiating organizational reform of the military.

3. The defense doctrine should be, above all, a document that outlines the right of state of the RP as the complex of supreme goals and purposes of state which emanate from the order to preserve and strengthen its autonomy and sovereign existence. Thus, the doctrine should discern and define the present and potential dangers to the state, confirm them with the methods and possibilities for countering these dangers, and based upon this define the general directions of state activity in the domestic and foreign fields, which directions will serve to strengthen the autonomous and sovereign existence of the nation. The doctrine should also define the long-term strategic goals of the operation of the state. The long frame defined by the Polish defense doctrine should be restricted to the period of transformation—the passage



from real socialism to democracy based on a market economy—which period is characterized by a rapid growth rate and a period of rapid change. After this period, the doctrine will have to be modified in order to adapt it to a stabilized (I hope) economic and political situation in our country.

The above-mentioned circumstances dictate that this document must be very general in nature. It should serve as the point of departure for diagnosing the errors and tendencies which arise both in Poland and in our external surroundings, and for finding appropriate and effective actions and practical solutions. The doctrine should outline the direction of not only our political and economic orientation but also of our constitutional orientation. In Poland's case, this is the direction leading to integration with the community of the Western world.

The defense doctrine should also present the general plan for the armed consideration of military dangers, especially aggression from without. It should mean of resolving quarrels and conflicts and, in this area, the doctrine should be not only the fundamental document outlining the system of state defense but also a sign of the nation's determination to defend its freedom.

#### Komorowski on Parys' Attack, Defense Structure

K.M. PARYS: A Polish M.P.R. (N) in Power

No. 16, 17 Apr 92 p. 11

(Interview with Sigm. Dępczyński, Bronisław Komorowski, former deputy minister of National Defense, by Ewa Szemplińska; place and date not given. *Prasa Media*.)

(Text) [Szemplińska] Let us begin with the citation from the URM [Office of the Council of Ministers] order according to which you are a candidate for chief of the Defense Ministry, who may require the approval of Jan Olszewski and the constitutional parties. Jan Parys must know both about personal considerations and about the president's list in which his dismissal was demanded. True, in his speech Jan Parys does not name any names but in the ranking published in *SIŁY ZWIĄT* you took second place after Minister Wąsowski.

[Komorowski] That is painful to me because it does credit my relatives as a provision deputy and member of the Sejm National Defense Commission [KON]. What is worse is that I was accused of participating in the collapse of the state. For this reason, at the KON meeting, I very quickly presented documented explanations of the circumstances of the speech of Minister Parys. In the other hand, the personal considerations of which you speak are impossible without an assessment of the opportunities for creating a coalition of 11 parties, and since it seems to me that there are small parties, I do not believe that Jan Parys has threatened by speculations about me. I would also like to remind you that on 16 February 1992 I received my dismissal from the hands of the prime minister—true, with a smile and thanks for my good work, but without substantive justification.

[Szemplińska] Then let us consider the variant of the toppling of ministerial cabinets.

[Komorowski] It seems to me to be considerably more likely that this was set up as a high level of government. And I am inclined to believe this because the announcement which I presented for publication in *SIŁY ZWIĄT* was blocked by PAP [Polish Press Agency]. I do not believe that this decision was made by the present head of the agency without an understanding with his boss.

[Szemplińska] People who know Józefina Napier say that it is an intrigue in his style, especially since he is not a spokesman for the coalition of 11.

[Komorowski] There is no answer to this question. In the other hand, Jan Parys' absence from the meeting of the Sejm KON led to an inquiry from me and from the other deputies.

[Szemplińska] Jan Olszewski, when asked to intervene, said that the minister "is not at the prime minister's disposal." What does this mean?

[Komorowski] It is a formula which means nothing. Ministers are obliged to be at his disposal, and besides, there is a kind of elementary moral courage which demands coming before the commission and explaining what is going on, or submitting one's resignation.

[Szemplińska] There is yet another version. You are merely a scapegoat. What is really going on here is that there is a power struggle between the Belvedere and the government.

[Komorowski] The fact is that the powers of the individual elements of state authority over the army are not properly regulated, and they will not be properly regulated before the constitutional debate which decides about the Polish system. This makes it all the more important, however, that we move (autonomously in this sphere, aiming toward an uncompromising and carefully weighed solution).

[Szemplińska] Who really governs the army?

[Komorowski] Formally, the person responsible for the entire armed forces is the minister of national defense, to whom both the WP [Polish Army] General Staff and the MON [Ministry of National Defense] institutions are subject. However, the army is led by the chief of the General Staff, while the defense policy is directed by the civilian minister. This is a normally-accepted principle throughout the world.

[Szemplińska] But the president is the superior of the armed forces.

[Komorowski] His role is vague but explained. When the president was Józef Władysław Jaruzelski, certain matters in my opinion, purposely, were not clarified, and since he was a military person and had authority in the army, formal regulations certainly seemed less essential.



[Szemplinska] Lech Wałęsa is a Jew that decided in a general election and he believes that he has the right to control the army.

[Kucimowski] He is right. His future powers will have to be defined precisely in the course of a joint discussion about the system. I merely wish to point out that if they were only the structure of state institutions, it would be a dangerous placement of (control, responsibility, and decision-making with regard to the army. For example, the French have a National Security Bureau which is a semi- and permanent council of the president and the prime minister, and only the importance of issues determines who has the deciding voice about them, is an interesting one. Adopting a similar model could help us to achieve a consensus and could make the president the final superior of the armed forces. I also believe that the powers of the president on the issue of the personnel makeup of the defense ministry should be upheld. His role should end here, however. The powers of the officers of the President's Chancellery must also be clearly defined.

[Szemplinska] Does the military see the prospect of security and stabilization in either of these structures—the government/parliamentary or the presidential?

[Kucimowski] Primarily in the presidential system, since this is a longer term prospect. But please remember that this structure does not guarantee immediate stability either. Jacek Mielke was responsible for the armed forces, then Lech Kaczyński, and now Jacek Matuszowski, and internally people are talking about Marian Włodarski. Moreover, the government/parliamentary structure will determine the shape and operation of the army, for this reduces itself to large staffs in Brussels and the structure of the army.

[Szemplinska] What characterizes the current situation? A coup d'état of businessmen?

[Kucimowski] I do not think so. The members of martial law is too timid and the weakness of continually repeating changes which do not take place in the great. No politician who proposes such a concept has met with approval.

[Szemplinska] But the military cannot be happy with this state of unrest and with the attempt to draw it into political games.

[Kucimowski] No, it is not happy with this. The army approved the depoliticization of the military, seeing in this an opportunity to isolate itself from political conflicts, and now it observes a "bunch" to grow weak, and it expresses its displeasure. It is not on the "front" of the army. But it must be reckoned with, although the distance is long from climbing to a coup.

[Szemplinska] As deputy minister of defense, did you have joint contact with any sort of covert structure operating in the Polish army?

[Kucimowski] With one which, from the viewpoint of military law, is illegal. The organization Veritas, however, is at least tolerated by the present leadership of the ministry.

## Background on Polish-German Arms Dealings

### Figures Involved Disclosed

V.I. Pilski & Group & Pilski & Group (V.I. Pilski & Group)  
A Polish 30 Mar 92, p. 1.

[Article by V.I. Pilski, "Secrets of the Legia (Army) (Part: The Boys From Arms Square)"]

[Text] The Legia-Kingpa spring march was not attended by anyone from Węgrów Holding Company. But not so long ago they used to be major visitors. They used to be completely the VIP section, so that visitors had to handle odd chairs because there was not enough room for all the beneficiaries. During the intermissions, high-ranking guests were shown in Warsaw's secret rooms. The Węgrów (Warsaw Secret) Foundation was established. A stadium, such as would be in 1991, is found in this part of the then well-divided Europe, was to arise. Now, all six of that group of "transmission" are occupying cells in two German jails. They were suspected and detained in connection with an attempt to illegally sell weapons to Iraq.

Sports are a good cover for shady deals and the prisoners were not the first to discover this.

The Legia matches were a prelude to meetings and agreements on deal processes. The companies that at this began even before Węgrów, during a Polish-Zimbabwe match on the Central Front (part of Legia Central Military Sports Club). During intermissions between the games and with the permission of the VIP section, discussed on the subject that was the most of profit from a single transaction in the first instance and under the law. As to the details of these deals, they were whom they met socially, and the subject of joint conversations on both sides of the fence, not the same, sought a task for opportunity alone. The process will be found by the special services, and it will take some time before we know the names of all the protagonists of the deal from "Arms Square."

EXPRESS WIEZIENIE was one of the first newspapers to print, behind the curtain of Węgrów, Węgrów, already reported on suspicious deals, secret, financial, and violations of law. No one has dared to do this, crystallization, no one has threatened to sue us for this. Now we know why. The network "beneficiaries" simply did not have the time to do it, because they were busy with something much more important. They had to make themselves in importing businesses and in the process of payment for the best secret prices of the (not) (Warsaw) (Warsaw). The threads led in many directions, but was the hall of 1991 in the corner of Węgrów Holding Company. It was the employees of that company who

were detained in Germany. The company's head claimed a political provocation. Let us wait until the full of facts is laid out.

A year ago witnesses from Thagex Company gave a reporter his business card and claimed that the suspect money deals were just a minor aspect of the affair. He claimed to be knowledgeable about contracts. There was no second meeting, because soon afterward the car in which he was on a German highway struck a TIR truck while traveling at a speed of 100 km per hour. Not everyone in the car died. Was it merely fatalism? The secret was taken to the grave. Perhaps it was one of the secrets of Legia's Central Finance Court?

Although it all promises began in Legia's tennis courts, other players of the nation's capital also are linked to the activities of the persons arrested in Frankfurt. Jerzy Brzozek used to be until later 1981 the director general of the construction of the Warsaw Metro. At the same time he belonged to the management of Wismar Holding Company.

These gentlemen made sure that the substantial funds they possessed and that profits gained would not be distributed as just any contract. Most of the operations continued with building the Warsaw Metro were assigned to Wismar's companies. One member of the German management of Metro construction said that the highest amounts were advanced by these companies and the payments were usually received at the right address. Brzozek also did not lose them. After all, in addition to directing the construction of the Metro he was the chairman of Wismar. This foundation was supposed to provide money to other players from Warsaw. On actually the nature of its activities was not transparent. Warsaw residents and visitors know a lot of the huge four-story warehouse in Bemowo, not far from the Praga district.

The situation was not good at the Metro's investment at the moment of funds from the municipal budget, though began to rise at Wismar.

The principal problem in Legia was for a long while the third among three arrested: General Bronisław Baranowski. For long years he was the chairman. To be sure, he played limited but important than Brzozek, but he lived in all in the VIP section during major international matches.

Baranowski used to be a major participant in the international People's Polish Army. He often frequented the VIP section of the Central Finance Court. He had extremely extensive contacts, especially in the former USSR. He had created firms and other companies, of prominent figures. He was considered successful. What is most interesting about the Wismar's administration is was allowed to act as the entrepreneur in 1978 until he left in 1980.

The Metro has received no money from the state budget, stopped funding this project is on the way, what is

previously. Legia has become impoverished after its stadium was blown off. The stadium site is decaying and the swimming pool is at ruins. Thus, with the funding sources plugged, only Legia's Central Finance Court has remained in operation. Until recently Jerzy Brzozek played tennis on that court, along with other prominent members of the old and new administrations. Now and then a new player would appear. After the requests were put down, risky deals were discussed.

Legia's employees are agreed by the rumors that soon now the tennis court will become the property of Baza Company. They are aware that the management of that company likes movies and theater, as for tennis that is something else. At least that is how it looks to them. They simply are not concerned with all the secrets. EXPRESS WILCZYŃSKI will try to be of assistance not only in exposing the warehouses in Bemowo. After all such warehouses may also be storing ammunition.

The office of the German prosecutor has initiated an investigation of the seven Poles detained on 10 April in Frankfurt-on-Main on the suspicion of illegal arms dealings. The authorities claim that they violated the law on exports of military hardware into each transaction requires approval by the German federal agencies. The detainees object and claim that they did not conclude any contract, they have appeared in a court as persons. Their appeal is being considered by the investigating magistrate, who will decide whether to continue their detention or to release them in their own country.

Let us add that the German law enforcement agencies refuse to disclose any information on this subject, and that the entire affair was given relatively little publicity in the press so that all are awaiting the fruits of the proceedings.

At the same time, however, the United States set its motion—according to REUTERS, which referred to THE NEW YORK TIMES—proceedings for the extradition of six Poles kept in German prisons in order to assist them before an American court for violating the law on arms exports. Their names, as listed, are Jerzy Napierski, Bronisław Baranowski, Jan Górecki, Zdzisław Górecki, Jerzy Brzozek, and Bronisław Baranowski. (The seventh person to be arrested in Frankfurt, Stan Kozminski, initially reported to be a Pole, is said to be a United States citizen.)

Ronald Renshaw, an American businessman who was detained on 11 April in New York on the same occasion of the attempted sale of arms from Poland to Iraq, subsequently released on bail, declared in an interview granted to THE NEW YORK TIMES that he had contracted no crime, because he had a permit for arms trading and he intended to legally transport military equipment from Poland to the Philippines and not to Iraq. He was sentenced. The secret agents demanded of the Eastern bloc officials that they provide military arms including weapons, whereas on 11 April Renshaw's group did not at all intend anything like that.

[In the United States] den report was mentioned solely in THE WASHINGTON POST and on several TV news-casts.

#### Photo Captions

1 p. 1 Jerry Bronowick used to be, among other things, a deputy minister of construction and the vice mayor of Warsaw, and between 1982 and June 1991 he was the director general of the construction of the Warsaw Metro.

2 p. 1 Jerry Nagorkowski used to be, among other things, deputy minister of finance from December 1986 until September 1990. For many years he had headed the Treasury Office in Warsaw.

3 p. 1 Wiesłach Baranicki, general of arms (ret.), used to be, among other things, deputy chief of the general staff of the Polish Army and, between 1984 and 1989, chief of the Main Directorate for Combat Training, Polish Army.

#### Radium Factory Profiled

WZEP03648 ALLIST EXPRESS WILCZORNY  
in Polish 1, 4, 5 Apr 92 p. 1

[Article by Czesław Curyło: "Lucznik Small Arms Plant Is Stung: Who Is the Culprit?"]

[Text] Anna Sewonder is not of Radium, and at her workplace she had requested that her current address not be divulged. She gave assurances, however, that she is not in hiding, it is just that she has been so unlucky in life. She could but did not depart for a training course for social workers.

She was on the verge of a nervous breakdown when she confided, "I just could not live if my husband were to be taken away to the United States and placed in jail there."

She had never before read GAZETA WYBORCZA, but now she practically begins her day with a visit to the newsstand and fearfully listens to the radio. Her mouth trembling, restraining her tears, she claimed, "GAZETA's reporters made of my husband a gangster, but that gangster earns 1,400,000 zlotys [Z] monthly and lives together with his family in an M-3 [luxurious apartment]."

They had first met in Szczecin. "Because I am a Socinister," she explains, Raymond Sewonder attended the department of mechanics at that city's polytechnic, while she majored in rehabilitation. After living in Pomerania for several years they decided in February 1976 to move to Radium. Her husband comes from Laskarzew, a small settlement near Radium, and has a sister living in Radium. Immediately after moving he began to work at Lucznik.

Engineer Sewonder climbed, one after another, career steps at that plant, without being punished. Barely two years ago, after the plant management was replaced, he became deputy director for manufacturing. In the last

few months he had painfully experienced the problems plaguing the plant. He traveled to Warsaw in search of a rescue for the plant.

Anna Sewonder narrated, "I am so nervous that I cannot remember it exactly, but it must have happened early in March. My husband traveled to Germany as a member of an official delegation. He was to remain on Weimaran's Day, and we even joked about the present he was going to bring me. He did not come back, and since he is a man of his word, I thought that he met with an accident. I called my husband's office and they told me not to worry, because the negotiations in Germany were being prolonged. I was notified that he was certain to return on 10 March. But he did not return."

"What happened next?"

"Then I became very upset, especially because this same Lucznik's Director for Engineering Bronisław Kilian telephoned and asked if I had any news from my husband, because they are surprised at his not having returned although two days earlier he had called to say that he was certain to get back after completing the negotiations."

Her job paid her Z2 million monthly. She spent her days on providing vocational rehabilitation for her clients and then returned to an empty home. And afterward, the worst moment came when she read that her husband was arrested in Frankfurt on suspicion of smuggling arms and could be extradited to the United States. "After all, I and my son could not even travel there to visit him," she declared achingly.

She does not believe that her husband is involved in some criminal affair. This is so unlike him. When the newspapers first reported on her husband's arrest, she received from people at Lucznik a steady stream of calls of sympathy and offers of help, a stream which continues to this very day. "And this is most important to me."

"Could you please describe what kind of man your husband is?"

"He is the kind of man, to whom work alone counts, not the home or the family. All these years he had never been late to work."

To this day Anna Sewonder has not been notified by Germans or Americans about her husband's arrest.

Director Sewonder is the legal representative of a Polish arms plant. From official sources it is known that, in detaining the Poles, the agents of the special services followed the principle that any trick is permitted so long as the CIA's aim is achieved.

#### The Plant's CEO Confirms

Engineer Waldemar Szajewski, the general director of the Radium-Lucznik and Sewonder's immediate superior, said

"Director Sewander traveled as a member of an official delegation pursuant to an understanding with me. While in Germany he was to engage in technical talks concerning our production. That is all I can say for now, and please understand that I do not know anything other than what I can glean from Press reports on what has happened."

"Did the German or American public prosecutor's office notify you about the detention of your deputy?"

"No, although several weeks have passed since then. I do not believe that Director Sewandek was involved in any illegal activities. I know him too well, but it also is not my custom to leap to a judgment prematurely, unlike some newspapers."

"Is Laczniak permitted to engage in arms dealings on its own?"

"Yes, we have the approval of our government, but I wish to emphasize that Laczniak Metal Works not only had not signed any contract last March but also has not established any contracts concerning exports of non-casting products."

"What does it mean, 'non-casting'?"

"Weapons, rifles and pistols. One more important issue is the last one and a half years Laczniak company has not been exporting arms to any country placed on the UN's embargo list, or on the additional list of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. This means that we did not sell arms to Iraq."

#### We Make Goods for Sale

On Monday 10 March Laczniak's directors and the board members of the plant's Solidarity attended a meeting in Warsaw at the Ministry of Industry to discuss a program for restructuring the enterprise. It was resolved to establish at once a special taskforce. Still, changes cannot be introduced overnight, and they will cost money, but everybody knows about the plant's dire financial situation.

That is why hardly anybody at Laczniak does not feel sympathy for Deputy Director Sewander and his arrest in Frankfurt-on-Main. The consensus of the workforce is that he had traveled there in order to keep the plant alive. The workforce is preparing a collective protest to express its solidarity with the detainee. This mood of determination is sensed already at the plant's office for admission of visitors, where, on seeing the visitor's passport, the person on duty welcomed the observation, "Director Sewander is an exceptionally honest man." Others, workers, too, at the plant say likewise, and there is a general mood of outrage at the manner in which the affair was reported by GAZETA WYBORCZA. "We never said that we are manufacturing Kalashnikovs' rifles for old age homes. Don't the Americans themselves deal in arms?" they asked.

The perennial director, who did not want to be named, has the highest regard for Director Sewander. "He did everything to save the plant. That also is the opinion of the entire workforce. After what happened things have come to such a pass that I drafted, as instructed by Director Sagarowski, a letter to the trade union requesting its consent to lay off 1,400 employees in the next few weeks, but that may not be the end of it."

A worker who happened to pass by added, "Had Deputy Director Sewander gotten the contract signed, our livelihood would have been assured for at least the next 10 months."

#### Without Complexes

Engineer Kilian, the director for engineering, said:

"We have no complexes. We manufacture the Makarov Symbol P-43 pistol, an excellent weapon, no worse than a Via. We also make the P-84, a machine pistol for Parabellum bullets, colloquially known as the Kalashnikov. It is not inferior to its American and German counterparts. Deputy Director Sewander left for Germany precisely in order to negotiate the sale of these pistols. We also are manufacturing a gun similar to the Israeli Uri, for commandos, etc."

Following the Frankfurt arrest, the director made available information on prewar dealings in arms. They used to be handled by Sepewa Company in 1938. In that year Poland's arms sales totaled 70,717,000 (prewar) zlotys, and the Radom plant was involved. Nearly 10 percent of Polish military spending derived from arms sales.

Director Kilian said, "Arms sales are one of the most profitable businesses. Following the collapse of the USSR, the Americans no longer have a major adversary. Demand for arms plummeted, and everyone is forced to look for markets abroad. In this business there is a ruthless competition for customers. Thus, Laczniak was hit."

#### The Matter Is Investigated

Minister Adam Gajarski appointed a commission for investigating the affair. As of the present he has no reasons to believe that any one of the Poles detained committed a crime.

Ios Strass, director of the Central Board of Engineering, in charge of overseeing arms sales for this post since less than a month, said:

"Laczniak was granted as far back as last fall a permit for independent sales of its products, and thus is consistent with the spirit of reform. This Radom plant was, unlike the Buzow plant, unable to be represented independently and so had to rely on middlemen like the ATS company. That was its mistake, but then consider that autonomy is still new to it."

The question of the authenticity of the Philippine Government certification which was submitted to the Central Board of Engineering by James Merendon during his visit to Warsaw, remains unexplained. The Philippine Embassy at present displays considerable restraint in this matter, and this is not surprising. Until we know the full truth, the possibility that the certificate might be forged cannot be precluded; it may even have been prepared by the CIA, without Deputy Director Sawander's knowing about it. That would make him innocent.

Deputy Director Kallan said:

"Soon now this entire affair will be cleared up. And then a real scandal will break out and we shall demand every compensation, because the persons behind this affair must be held accountable."

Last Tuesday a foreign customer, whose visit had been scheduled long in advance, was expected at Łazienki. He never arrived. And on Wednesday the management sat down at a table with the trade unions to discuss layoffs.

#### **American Investor Complaints Aired**

WCEPolska, Warsaw, *RYNOK ZAGRANICZNY*  
in Polish No. 41, 4 Apr 92, p. 7

[Article by (A.S.): "Ambiguous Signals for Foreign Investors. The Polish-American Chamber of Commerce Visits the Sejm"]

[Text] The attitude of economic cooperation between Poland and the United States, is far from the expected levels, was the principal cause of a meeting of representatives of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce with four Sejm economic commissions (Agriculture and Food Industry, Economic Systems and Industry, Foreign Economic Cooperation, and Trade and Services).

The Polish-American Chamber of Commerce includes representatives of Polish and American business who together with the economic self-government bodies in both countries are attempting to form a lobby to promote the development of cooperation between Poland and the United States.

Andrzej Arcuskiński, president of the National Chamber of Commerce, who chaired the deliberations, emphasized the significance of cooperation with the United States and also drew attention to the joint problems that concern all foreign investors, especially the lack of favorable legal measures and a climate favoring the inflow of capital to Poland.

Robert W. Brinberry, who heads the American section of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce, expressed concern at the ambiguous signals greeting investors in Poland in the name of business people from his country. They are apparent, among other ways, in the contradictory reactions of various Polish administrative bodies and the overly slow changes in economic policy. R. W. Brinberry cited a long list of limitations which block American investment. Among them are a prohibition on opening convertible-currency accounts by partnerships with foreign capital and the generally poor condition of the banking system in Poland.

He also drew attention to the faults tax system, to the application of the "tax on excessive wage increases" to firms with foreign capital. He also called for the exclusion of foreign persons from the 45-percent tax for social insurance. The chairman of the American section also told those gathered that our neighbors from East Europe, especially CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), are competing for investment resources.

Deputy Andrzej Czerwinski, chairman of the Polish section of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce, called for the formation in Poland of a special office, an ombudsman for foreign investment, who would have the power to intervene in cases when economic initiatives are blocked.

Marek Raciorkiewicz, representing the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Poland, noted the lack of cooperation by the Polish Government with business, which appears, among other ways, in the inability to grant loan guarantees. Deputy Ryszard Szwedowski proposed forming a system of incentives for locating American investment in the areas of agriculture and the food industry, which can bring more rapid effects than in industry.

During the discussion, proposals were also made to form a special Sejm subcommittee to remove legal barriers blocking foreign capital. Stefan Lewandowski, president of the Chamber of Foreign Investors, said that proposals to remove many of the limitations were made a dozen or so years ago.

The discussion began in the Sejm building will be continued at the 11th Plenary Session of the Polish-American Chamber of Commerce at the beginning of May 1992. Joan Edwards, counselor for trade of the American Embassy, and Paul Wackerhaeuf, counselor for economics of the American Embassy, also participated in the meeting. Thaddeus Karpinski, director of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Washington, also came to Warsaw. On the other hand, none of the Polish ministers of the economic ministries who were invited to the Sejm meeting came.

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

8 June 1992